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Letter dated 26 July 2017 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2339 (2017) addressed to the President of the Security Council

The members of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2339 (2017) have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 28 (c) of resolution 2339 (2017), the midterm report on their work.

The attached report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic on 7 July 2017 and was considered by the Committee on 21 July 2017.

The Panel of Experts would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

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Coordinator

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pursuant to Security Council resolution 2339 (2017)

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Midterm report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2339 (2017)

Summary

More than one year after the election of President Touadéra, little progress has been made in addressing the root causes of the crisis in the Central African Republic. Whereas several mediations — at times competing with one another — have been initiated, the prospects for disarmament remain distant. The Rome Agreement of 19 June 2017, the fifth agreement signed by armed groups in four years, is widely seen as a further step in the political process rather than as its completion.

In this context, while Bangui has remained relatively quiet since the demonstrations of 24 October 2016 against the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), most of the national territory remains under the control of armed groups whose activities prevent the restoration of State authority.

The security situation has deteriorated significantly owing to fighting among armed groups. Hostilities have continued in the north-west between general Sidiki's group, Retour, réclamation, réhabilitation, and anti-balaka groups. Since November 2016, there has also been heavy fighting in the centre and the east between, on the one hand, a coalition led by the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) and, on the other, the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC). The latter fighting is primarily the result of attempts by listed individuals and FPRC leaders Abdoulaye Hissène and Nourredine Adam to reunify the ex-Séléka.

The current shifting of the fighting towards the east adds a new problem in an area where the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) remains active. This state of affairs represents a growing threat to civilians, in particular in the context of the withdrawal of the African Union Regional Task Force from the area.

Anti-balaka armed groups have emerged in new prefectures (Haute-Kotto, Haut-Mbomou) and continue to represent a major security threat, whether by pursuing local, often criminal, objectives or by being mobilized by actors with a broader political agenda, for example, Bangui-based politicians or FPRC.

Ongoing hostilities are fuelled by a regular flow of weapons through routes that have been identified in previous reports of the Panel of Experts, in particular from Chad, the Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Seizures of significant volumes of hunting ammunition produced by the Manufacture d'armes et de cartouches congolaise (MACC) from Pointe-Noire, Congo, illustrate the increase in trafficking activities along the Oubangui River.

The illegal exploitation of natural resources remains a major source of income for armed groups, not only in the east, where ex-Séléka factions fight one another for control of mining sites, but also in the west, as illustrated by the way local anti-balaka groups benefit from the new gold mine of Koro-Mpoko (Ouham prefecture). The report also provides information on the regional business interests of Abdoulaye Hissène, in particular in the trade of gold and crude oil.

The deterioration of the security situation has resulted in a marked increase in the number of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. The country is experiencing a resurgence of dangerous rhetoric that targets specific ethnic communities, in particular Fulanis. As of May 2017, the number of internally

displaced persons totalled approximately 500,000 (about 10 per cent of the population), a level equivalent to that at the height of the crisis in 2014. The first half of 2017 was the deadliest with regard to attacks against peacekeepers since the establishment of MINUSCA in September 2014.

The implementation of United Nations sanctions measures remains weak. Travel ban violations continue, including by Nourredine Adam and François Bozizé. The national authorities have also failed to implement the asset freeze and several of the listed individuals continue to receive their salaries as government officials.

At the same time, the insistence of armed group leaders to include provisions for the lifting of sanctions in documents negotiated in Angola (December 2016) and Rome (June 2017) demonstrates that sanctions have an impact on their activities. In this regard, the Panel of Experts welcomes the announcement of the freezing of Abdoulaye Hissène's assets by the Minister of Justice of Chad, on 24 June.

The national authorities of the Central African Republic continue to express contradictory views on the arms embargo. If some officials have publicly recognized that the embargo does not per se prevent the rearmament of the national forces, criticizing the embargo remains an effective tool for those willing to blame the United Nations for insecurity in the country.

Finally, the report provides information on the attempts to destabilize the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo by Congolese nationals connected to some ex-Séléka individuals and involved in the recruitment of fighters as well as the trafficking of military equipment on the territory of the Central African Republic.

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Annexes*

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

I. Background

1. On 27 January 2017, the Security Council adopted its resolution 2339 (2017), by which the Panel of Experts was mandated, *inter alia*, to provide to the Council, after discussion with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, a midterm report no later than 30 July 2017.
2. On 6 March 2017, the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Committee, appointed the five members of the Panel (S/2017/194), which consists of a regional expert (Paul-Simon Handy), an arms expert (Mélanie de Groof), a finance and natural resources expert and Coordinator (Romain Esmenjaud), an armed groups expert (Ilyas Oussedik) and a humanitarian expert (Luis Ángel Benavides Hernández).
3. During the reporting period (March to mid-June 2017), the Panel maintained an almost permanent presence in the Central African Republic, traveling to 12 of the 16 prefectures (see map contained in annex 1).
4. The present report assesses the implementation of sanctions imposed by the Security Council (embargo, travel ban and asset freeze) and addresses a number of thematic issues, with the aim of identifying individuals and entities involved in sanctionable activities, as defined in paragraphs 16 and 17 of Council resolution 2339 (2017).
5. In addition to missions undertaken within the Central African Republic, the Panel conducted official visits to Cameroon and the United Arab Emirates during the reporting period.
6. The Panel notes with appreciation the support and collaboration of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).

Methodology

7. The Panel endeavours to ensure compliance with the standards recommended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions in its report of 22 December 2006 (see S/2006/997, annex). While it intends to be as transparent as possible, in situations where identifying sources would expose them or others to unacceptable safety risks, the Panel intends to withhold identifying information.
8. The Panel is equally committed to the highest degree of fairness and will endeavour to make available to parties, where appropriate and possible, any information in the report for which those parties may be cited, for their review, comment and response, within a specified deadline.
9. The Panel expresses its condolences to the families of Zaida Catalán and Michael Sharp, members of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, who were killed on mission in March 2017.

II. Political discussions: many channels, little progress

10. Since President Touadéra assumed office in March 2016, the need for a new political agreement aimed at addressing major grievances of armed groups has been a central area of contention among major actors involved in the management of the crisis.

11. Some members of the national Government and major international actors share the view that the holding of elections has created the conditions for disarmament and that elected authorities have no reason to negotiate with armed groups that they deem to be illegitimate. They also consider that there is no need to unravel existing agreements, in particular those concluded at the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation in May 2015 (S/2015/344).¹

12. Some actors, however, in particular the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) and the Mokom branch of anti-balaka, consider that elections have done little to resolve the root causes of the crisis, hence the need for a global political agreement (annex 2.1).

13. Under pressure from actors with divergent requests, the Government has moved forward in an uneven manner, struggling to clarify its disarmament strategy and often remaining elusive in its engagement with various mediation initiatives. This has led to criticism regarding the lack of transparency from the Presidency, in particular by the Speaker of the Parliament, who launched his own peace initiative (annex 2.2).²

A. African initiative for peace and reconciliation (African-Union-led initiative)

14. The African Union-led initiative for peace and reconciliation was officially endorsed by the African Union at its summit, held in Addis Ababa in January 2017.³ It is a common initiative by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the African Union, as well as Angola, the Congo and Chad. It aims at reaching a peace and reconciliation agreement between the national Government and the 14 main armed groups.

15. The initiative also follows up previous mediation attempts made by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Angola and Chad that are now aggregated into one. It proceeds from the belief that a lasting political solution must involve neighbouring countries, as regional dynamics have always had a strong impact on the crisis.

16. The perception among international partners that the African Union initiative was mainly aimed at providing amnesty⁴ to leaders of armed groups has generated much controversy.⁵ The prospect of granting amnesty to those leaders runs against the conclusions of the Bangui Forum on National Reconciliation. At the same time, both government and international partners are struggling to propose viable incentives for armed groups to lay down their weapons.

B. Sant'Egidio process and Rome Agreement of 19 June 2017

17. On 19 June 2017, the Community of Sant'Egidio gathered a wide array of national and international actors who signed a Political Agreement for Peace in the

¹ Meetings with government officials and diplomats of the Central African Republic, Bangui, April 2017.

² Meeting with Karim Meckassoua, Bangui, 8 June 2017.

³ See www.peaceau.org/uploads/joint-statement-on-car-eng.docx-19-02-2017.pdf.

⁴ This perception was mostly generated by the meeting reports signed in Angola, which underline the need for a truth and reconciliation commission in exchange for amnesty (see annex 2.3).

⁵ Meetings with ECCAS, MINUSCA, European Union, French and African Union sources, Bangui, 20 to 27 January 2017.

Central African Republic (annex 2.4). This accord follows several rounds of closed-door discussions between the Community and representatives of leaders of armed groups, held in Rome from December 2016 to May 2017.

18. While the signing of the Rome Agreement represents a positive development, several challenges remain:

(a) As in all previous agreements, the capacity of leaders present in Rome to actually influence events on the ground is unclear. This is particularly the case for anti-balaka groups (see paras. 83-86) as well as some ex-Séléka factions, such as the Mouvement patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC) (see para. 58);

(b) The provisions of the Agreement remain vague, with no mechanism to follow up commitments made;

(c) It is unclear how the call made in the Agreement for consultations on the lifting of United Nations sanctions and references to the establishment of a truth, justice and reconciliation commission and to the presidential "right of pardon" will be reconciled with international obligations related to the International Criminal Court and the Special Criminal Court (annex 2.5);

(d) It remains to be seen how the Agreement will impact the implementation of the African-Union-led initiative once it is rolled out, confirming the limited coordination between the two initiatives.

C. Advisory and Monitoring Committee for National Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration and Repatriation

19. The Government-led disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation consultative committee held its fourth and fifth sessions on 20 and 21 April and on 8 and 9 June, respectively. That body has been considered by some in the Government and the international community to be the appropriate venue for political negotiations, as it brings together all relevant stakeholders, both national authorities and armed groups. Whereas the fact that all 14 armed groups have been participating in the Committee's work since April can be deemed to be a political success, it remains to be seen how such participation will translate into actual progress on the ground.

20. FPRC representatives, in particular, continue to link their commitment to disarm with the signing of a political agreement that takes into account their grievances (annex 2.1). The Panel also notes that the expectations of armed groups regarding the benefits of the participation in the process for ex-combatants are disconnected from the reality of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation programme.⁶

III. Debates on the arms embargo and national defence and security forces

A. Calls to lift the arms embargo

21. In its 2016 final report (S/2016/1032, paras. 60-64), the Panel cited an increasing number of calls for the lifting of the embargo. In Bangui, on 14 April

⁶ Meetings with armed group representatives, Bangui, April, May and June 2017. Leaders expect that most of their fighters will be able to participate in the process, and fighters expect money rather than training.

2017, the Panel organized a briefing for the national authorities of the Central African Republic to facilitate a better understanding of the regime, including its notification and exemption procedures, and prevent the politicization of that issue. Details of the discussions are included in annex 3.1.

22. In recent months, the Panel has noted some progress in the better understanding of the arms embargo regime. The Minister of Defence has on several occasions reiterated that the embargo does not per se prevent the rearmament of national forces.⁷

23. However, the embargo remains a strong tool for actors who want to mobilize nationalist sentiments and blame the United Nations for insecurity in the country.⁸ While President Touadéra did not reiterate his previous calls to lift the arms embargo during his address to the Security Council on 16 March 2017, he has expressed a different view on other occasions.⁹

B. Calls to equip and deploy national and security armed forces

24. National authorities have expressed the wish to receive weaponry, reaching out to the European Union and its member States for donations, sales or support in its relations with private companies (annex 3.2). Bosnia and Herzegovina and Georgia have expressed interest in selling surplus weapons and ammunition to the Central African Republic (annex 3.3).¹⁰ France informed the Panel of the possibility that an exemption request be submitted to the Committee for the transfer of weapons seized in 2016.¹¹ In connection with the Panel's recommendation (S/2016/694, para. 113 (b)), Cameroon has submitted an exemption request to the Committee for the return to the Central African Republic of military equipment in its possession that belongs to the armed forces of the Central African Republic.¹²

25. There exists a real and legitimate need to equip the first battalion trained by the European Union Training Mission.¹³ However, States that donate or sell weaponry must ensure that the exemption procedures and guidelines of the Committee are carefully respected, including by providing details on the type and origin of the equipment, coordinate with MINUSCA and ensure that the transferred stockpiles will be managed securely (S/2015/936, paras. 46-51 and 247 (i)).

⁷ Fridolin Ngoulou, "Centrafrique : Les États-Unis s'engagent à équiper les FACA", 7 March 2017. Available from <http://rjd.org/centrafrique-etats-unis-sengagent-a-equiper-faca/>. At the regional level, the report of the meeting of chiefs of defence staff at the sixth ministerial meeting of the Joint Coordination Mechanism of the African Union Regional Task Force (30 March) noted that the embargo on the Central African Republic does not impede the Government of that country from acquiring arms to equip its defence forces.

⁸ Judicael Yongo, "Centrafrique : la société civile appelle à la vigilance populaire après la prorogation de l'embargo", 1 February 2017. Available from <http://rjd.org/centrafrique-societe-civile-appelle-a-vigilance-populaire-apres-prorogation-de-lembargo/?platform=hootsuite>.

⁹ Jacky Naegelen, "Faustin-Archange Touadéra: Nous saluons toutes les initiatives permettant de retrouver la paix", 30 March 2017. Available from www.rfi.fr/emission/20170330-rea-touadere-fpre-adam-upc-darass-humanitaire-ddr-mediations-paix-finances-bruxell.

¹⁰ Meeting with the European Union Training Mission, Bangui, 15 June 2017.

¹¹ Telephone discussion with a French official, 5 June 2016.

¹² Letter of the Permanent Mission of Cameroon, 13 April 2017. Panel's mission to Cameroon, 23 to 26 May 2017.

¹³ Meeting with the European Union Training Mission, 15 June 2017. Letter from Joseph Yakété, 6 January 2017. The Mission completed the training of the first FACA battalion in May 2017.

C. Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation pilot project

26. In an attempt to integrate demobilized combatants into FACA and ensure that the army is representative of the population, the Government, with the support of the European Union Training Mission and MINUSCA, has decided to form and train a "mixed DDR company" composed of both current FACA and members of the 14 armed groups.¹⁴ To date, nine armed groups have submitted their lists of participants.¹⁵

D. Presidential security guard

27. On 18 May, the Panel observed a civilian aircraft from Equatorial Guinea at Bangui Airport. Upon inquiry, the Panel learned that the aircraft had transported personnel from the presidential security guard and the defence and security forces to receive operational training in Equatorial Guinea by, among others, nationals of Israel.¹⁶ On 28 June, two aircraft left Bangui Airport en route to Kigali.¹⁷ The Chief of Staff of the national army confirmed that 200 FACA had left for Rwanda for special forces training.¹⁸

28. The Panel notes that initiatives related to the establishment of a presidential security guard have lacked transparency. It recalls that the provision of assistance in support of the security sector reform, including operational and non-operational training, must be coordinated with MINUSCA and notified — in advance — to the Committee pursuant to paragraph 1 (b) of resolution 2339 (2017).

29. Cases of violations of the arms embargo are addressed in paragraphs 64 to 70, 73 to 75 and 90 to 93. Annex 3.4 includes a map with main trafficking routes.

IV. Implementation of targeted sanctions (travel ban and asset freeze)

30. Although implementation of the sanctions measures remains weak, the Panel continues to hold the view that the measures have a strong signalling effect, as demonstrated by the insistence of leaders of armed groups to lift them, in particular during discussions in Angola and Rome (see paras. 16-18).

A. Violations of the travel ban

Nourredine Adam: travel ban violations in the context of mediations

31. The Panel obtained first-hand testimony that Nourredine Adam's travel to Sido, Chad, on 30 October 2016 (S/2016/1032, para. 43) to attend a meeting organized by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation¹⁹ was facilitated by the authorities of Chad. He and other participants travelled by road from Ndélé

¹⁴ Meeting with the European Union Training Mission, Bangui, 15 June 2017. Confidential document, 9 March 2017.

¹⁵ Telephone discussion with an official of the European Union Training Mission, 20 June 2017.

¹⁶ Meeting with a confidential source, Bangui, 17 May 2017.

¹⁷ Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 29 and 30 June 2017.

¹⁸ Meeting of the Technical Coordination Committee, 3 July 2017.

¹⁹ Organization of Islamic Cooperation letter to the Panel, 28 November 2016.

(Bamingui-Bangoran) to the Chadian border and were later driven by security officials of Chad to Sido.²⁰

32. On 15 December 2016, Nourredine Adam also participated in a meeting held in Benguela, Angola. Flights between Moundou, Chad, and Luanda (14 and 17 December 2016) were undertaken in aircraft of the Government of Angola, in cooperation with the authorities of Chad.²¹ After Angola informed the Panel on 28 March 2017 that the database of the State Migration Services did not show any migratory movement to Angola by him, the Panel sent a new request for information on 24 April 2017, transmitting copies of the documents signed by the ex-Séléka leader in Benguela on 15 December 2016 (annex 2.3). The Government of Angola has yet to provide a response.

33. The Panel recalls that pursuant to paragraph 10 (c) of resolution 2339 (2017), and upon approval by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic, listed individuals can travel to take part in meetings furthering the objectives of peace and national reconciliation.

François Bozizé

34. The Panel was provided with a photo of François Bozizé reportedly taken at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport on 18 November 2016 (see annex 4.1). It requested information from the authorities of Kenya on 1 December 2016.²² To date, no reply has been provided to the Panel.

35. On 10 May 2017, the Panel was informed that François Bozizé was aboard Ethiopian Airlines flight ET336 from Addis Ababa to Entebbe, Uganda.²³ On 25 May, the Panel wrote to Ethiopian Airlines, which has yet to provide a response. On 28 December 2015, the company had confirmed that listed individual François Bozizé had been added to its no-fly list.

B. Lack of implementation of the asset freeze by national authorities (Alfred Yékatom, Eugène Ngaïkosset and Habib Soussou)

36. The Panel has collected evidence that Alfred Yékatom's salary payments continue to be made to his account at the Banque sahélo-saharienne pour l'investissement et le commerce (BSIC) in Bangui (annex 4.2). He also obtained a personal loan in January 2017.

37. Alfred Yékatom has also created a private security company,²⁴ as confirmed by the Minister of the Interior and Public Security, who explained that he was unaware that the freezing of listed individuals' assets also implied the freezing of the assets of the companies they might head. On 19 May 2017, the Minister committed to take appropriate action.²⁵

38. The Panel also obtained evidence that listed individual Habib Soussou has continued to receive his salary as a FACA officer through his BSIC account in Bangui (annex 4.3). The Panel's final report of 2016 cited the case of another

²⁰ Meeting with confidential sources, Ndélé, 19 January 2017.

²¹ Meeting with Zacharia Damane, Birao, 24 January 2017; meeting with diplomatic sources, Bangui, 27 January 2017.

²² Meeting with representatives of the Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations, New York, 1 December 2016.

²³ Telephone discussion with a confidential source, 10 May 2017.

²⁴ Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui 19 May 2017.

²⁵ Meeting with Jean-Serge Bokassa, Bangui, 19 May 2017.

sanctioned FACA officer, Eugène Ngaïkosset (S/2016/1032, para. 46), whose salary continues to be paid through his Ecobank account.

39. Ecobank and BSIC representatives separately informed the Panel that the freezing of listed individuals' assets was the responsibility of the national Government, and that the asset freeze would be enforced only upon request of the Ministry of Finance and Budget (S/2016/1032, para. 48) and pursuant to a judicial decision.²⁶

40. Various institutions of the Central African Republic continue to hold one another responsible for the lack of implementation of the asset freeze. After the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) had discussed the issue with President Touadéra on 17 March 2017 in New York, the Permanent Representative of the Central African Republic addressed a letter to the Committee on 26 April 2017 indicating that, owing to the separation of powers, the freezing of Alfred Yékatom and Eugène Ngaïkosset's assets could only be decided by the President of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister, rather than by President Touadéra himself.

41. The Chair of the Committee subsequently addressed a letter to both the President of the National Assembly and the Prime Minister on 11 May 2017. According to the Panel's understanding, neither the President nor the Prime Minister has yet to provide a response to the Committee. The President of the National Assembly informed the Panel that he had initially requested that Alfred Yékatom's salary payment be terminated. However, after Mr. Yékatom had threatened accountancy staff of the National Assembly, the President decided that the payments should resume, considering also that the ultimate responsibility for the asset freeze rested with the Government.²⁷

C. Abdoulaye Hissène's assets, regional interests and connections

42. On 17 May 2017, the name of Abdoulaye Hissène was added to the Committee's sanctions list.²⁸

43. In addition to his role as military leader, Abdoulaye Hissène has mobilized financial resources in support of the FPRC-led coalition, owing in part to his regional connections and business interests that have been developed over the years. As early as 2009, he was the owner of an N'Djamena-based company, Djiguira (annex 4.4). As illustrated below, the notoriety and travel documents (Central African Republic diplomatic passport) he acquired as a member of the Government during the transition period provided new opportunities to further develop his regional networks.

Abdoulaye Hissène's business connections in Chad

44. Abdoulaye Hissène has connections with a Chadian company, Abi Tchad, which is involved in the oil business. In late 2014, he arranged meetings between representatives of Abi Tchad and a European firm to facilitate the sale of Chadian crude oil.²⁹ Various documents, including several agreements between the two companies and letters that confirm Abi Tchad's engagement to sell a stock of oil allegedly ceded by the Société des hydrocarbures du Tchad, were found in

²⁶ Meeting with the Director-General of BSIC, Bangui, 30 January 2017.

²⁷ Meeting with Karim Meckassoua, Bangui, 8 June 2017.

²⁸ See <https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/sanctions/2127/sanctions-list-materials>.

²⁹ Letter from a confidential source, 12 May 2017. Telephone discussion with a confidential source, 25 June 2017.

Abdoulaye Hissène's house by the national security forces in Bangui (annex 4.5). Ultimately, the sale of crude oil did not take place, as Abi Tchad was not in fact in possession of the oil which it had committed to trade.³⁰

45. While it remains unclear whether Abdoulaye Hissène has ever held any official position in Abi Tchad, his role as an intermediary and the fact that documents were found in his house demonstrate that he has interests in Abi Tchad's activities.

Announcement of the freezing of Abdoulaye Hissène's assets in Chad

46. Following the listing of Abdoulaye Hissène on 17 May, and in light of the foregoing information, the Panel wrote to the Permanent Mission of Chad to the United Nations on 24 May to confirm whether he had assets in Chad and, if necessary, whether the authorities had frozen them. On 24 June, the Minister of Justice of Chad announced that Abdoulaye Hissène's assets in Chad would be frozen and that he would be denied access to the territory of Chad.³¹ The nature of Abdoulaye Hissène's assets were not indicated.

Abdoulaye Hissène's gold business in Nairobi

47. The Panel was informed that in early 2016, Abdoulaye Hissène reached out to potential buyers to sell 300 kilograms of gold allegedly stored in Nairobi.³² The buyers approached by him told the Panel that the latter was unable to provide reliable documentation that demonstrated the possession of such a quantity of gold (annex 4.6). Moreover, the Panel has been unable to obtain any evidence of the existence of the Kenyan company, Sovereign Freighters Ltd, which Abdoulaye Hissène claimed to partner with as his clearing agent (annex 4.7).

48. The Panel notes that there have been numerous cases of individuals based in Kenya who have received payments in exchange for commitments to provide gold which they in fact did not possess.³³

49. In its final report of December 2016, the Panel noted that in September 2014, Abdoulaye Hissène had concluded a sale and purchase agreement in Nairobi that amounted to \$9.9 million (S/2016/1032, para. 114). However, the Panel does not have evidence that the transaction took place and that he in fact owned the gold in question.

50. Annex 4.8 provides information on Abdoulaye Hissène's attempts to invest in a Cameroon-based company.

D. Bureau d'achat de diamant en Centrafrique (BADICA) delisting request

51. In a letter dated 24 April addressed to the Chair of the Committee in support of its delisting request, the sanctioned company Bureau d'achat de diamant en Centrafrique (BADICA) recognized the mistakes committed in the past and described its newly established due diligence policy. It is the understanding of the Panel that the delisting request is currently on hold in the Committee.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ VOA Afrique, "Gel des avoirs d'un chef de guerre centrafricain au Tchad", 24 June 2017. Available from <https://www.voafrique.com/a/gel-des-avoirs-d-un-chef-de-guerre-centrafricain-au-tchad/3914493.html>.

³² Telephone discussions with confidential sources, 22 and 25 June 2017.

³³ Richard Munguti, "Nairobi businessman charged in Sh22m gold scam", *Daily Nation*, 22 June 2017. Available from www.nation.co.ke/news/Nairobi-businessman-charged-Sh22m-gold-scam/1056-3982792-38vuh/index.html.

V. Fighting between the FPRC-led coalition and the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique in eastern Central African Republic

A. Summary account of the fighting

52. The long-standing tensions between the FPRC-led coalition and the Union pour la paix en Centrafrique (UPC) (S/2016/694, paras. 92-96) evolved into open confrontation on 21 November 2016 when the coalition attacked UPC positions in Bria. In order to weaken UPC and eventually take its headquarters in Bambari, FPRC conducted attacks on the Bria-Ippy-Bambari and the Mbrés-Bakala-Bambari axes from December 2016 to February 2017.

53. After members of the coalition tried to cross the "red line" established by MINUSCA in the vicinity of Bambari, MINUSCA helicopters launched an assault on 11 February, allegedly killing several FPRC combatants, including ex-Séléka General Joseph Zoundeiko. MINUSCA declared Bambari an "armed group free zone" and secured the departure from the city of UPC leader Ali Darassa and anti-balaka "general" Gaëtan Boadé by the end of February.

54. As a result, while it refrained from attacking Bambari, the FPRC-led coalition continued to target UPC as the latter reorganized itself eastwards. From 20 to 24 March 2017, a coordinated effort by FPRC and anti-balaka groups expelled UPC from Nzako and Bakouma (Mbomou prefecture).

55. On 13 May, Bangassou was attacked by anti-balaka elements without any FPRC involvement in the fighting (see paras. 87-89). Thereafter, several clashes took place between FPRC and anti-balaka, including those anti-balaka with whom FPRC had earlier collaborated. After anti-balaka had attacked FPRC positions in Nzako, FPRC retaliated by attacking anti-balaka in Bakouma and its surroundings on 6 June, and threatened to do likewise in Bangassou (annex 5.1).

B. Dynamics of the FPRC-led coalition: establishment and reinforcement

Objectives of the coalition: ex-Séléka reunification

56. The main objective of the FPRC-led coalition is to reunify the ex-Séléka groups under a single chain of command and to form an entity that can exert strong political leverage in negotiations with the Government.

57. The refusal of UPC to join the coalition has therefore been interpreted as treason by the FPRC leadership. Abdoulaye Hissène told the Panel that FPRC was not ready to negotiate with Ali Darassa and would continue to fight UPC until the armed group had disappeared as a political entity or was absorbed into the coalition.³⁴

A loose alliance

58. Organized around a High Supreme Council, headed by Nourredine Adam, and a National Council on Defence and Security, headed by Abdoulaye Hissène (S/2016/1032, para. 162), the coalition includes leaders from several ex-Séléka groups, including Mahamat Al-Khatim from MPC (annex 5.2), Azor Alite and Zakaria Damane from the Rassemblement patriotique pour le renouveau de Centrafrique (RPRC), as well as Ahmat Issa from the former Arab faction of UPC.³⁵ Though Abdoulaye Hissène is in practice the military leader, the command structure

³⁴ Meeting with Abdoulaye Hissène, Bria, 13 April 2017.

³⁵ General Ahmat Issa was killed on 17 June 2017.

remains relatively unclear, with several leaders having introduced themselves as the coalition's chief of staff, including General Azor Alite, Mahamat Saleh and Mahamat Al-Khatim. In addition, most of those leaders still command their own troops and decide independently on the degree of support provided to each operation.

Conflicting views within MPC

59. On 6 January 2017, Bangui-based MPC political leaders, including Abdel Karim Moussa, who later signed the Rome Agreement, rejected the group's alliance with the FPRC coalition and dismissed Mahamat Al-Khatim as MPC Chief of Staff (annex 5.3). However, that fissure has had a limited impact on the ground, with Mahamat Al-Khatim maintaining control over most of his troops as well as his cooperation with FPRC.

Ad hoc cooperation with anti-balaka

60. Anti-balaka groups have also joined the anti-UPC coalition on an ad hoc basis (see para. 54). FPRC leaders told the Panel that Maxime Mokom, with Gaëtan Boadé as one of his main affiliates on the ground,³⁶ was part of the coalition.³⁷ While Gaëtan Boadé's participation has been confirmed, Maxime Mokom has denied commanding the fighting.³⁸

61. An alliance between FPRC and the Mokom branch of anti-balaka would constitute the revitalization of the political alliance borne of the so-called Nairobi agreement of 2015 (see S/2015/936, paras. 24-41, and annex 1.5), whose members currently remain opposed to what they perceive as an alliance between the Government and UPC.

Tensions caused by the participation of anti-balaka

62. The involvement of anti-balaka combatants has raised tensions within the FPRC-led coalition. The Arab faction of the coalition has expressed concern that the anti-foreigner rhetoric used by anti-balaka could be harmful to ex-Séléka unity and to the Arab faction in particular, which tends to be portrayed as Chadian.³⁹ That faction clashed with the anti-balaka groups in Bria from 18 to 20 May and on 20 June.⁴⁰

Anti-Fulani rhetoric of some members of the coalition

63. One element that unifies the FPRC-led coalition is the depiction of Ali Darassa as a foreign fighter who should be expelled. Such inflammatory anti-Fulani⁴¹ rhetoric has been used to mobilize the population against UPC, in particular the anti-balaka groups. The Panel notes that the anti-Fulani rhetoric is nowadays widespread in the country and that the current situation is reminiscent of that in 2014, when the negative discourse against one specific Muslim community — the Chadians — later led to the targeting of the Muslim community as a whole.

³⁶ Members of the Ngaïssona branch told the Panel that Gaëtan Boadé was no longer working with them; meeting with Dieudonné Ndomaté, 6 April 2017.

³⁷ Meeting with Abdoulaye Hissène, Bria, 13 April 2017. Meeting with Moussa Maouloud and Lambert Moukove, Kaga-Bandoro, 16 January 2017.

³⁸ Meetings with Maxime Mokom, Bangui, 21 January and 7 May 2017.

³⁹ Meeting with Ahmat Issa in Bria, 11 April 2017.

⁴⁰ General Azor told the Panel that members of the Arab faction were foreigners. Meeting with Azor Alite in Bria, 10 April 2017.

⁴¹ Azor Alite compared Fulanis to animals and described them as fake Muslims. Meeting with Azor Alite, Bria, 10 April 2017.

Arms-trafficking and recruitment of local and foreign fighters

Recruitment and arms supplies

64. FPRC and MPC fighters are well equipped with arms, military uniforms, satellite phones, motorcycles and vehicles (annex 5.4). On the border with Chad, sanctioned individual Haroun Gaye continues to oversee the arms-trafficking activities of the coalition in Tissi, the main trafficking hub for FPRC, which is occasionally visited by Nourredine Adam.⁴² Vehicles coming from Um Dukhun, Sudan, cross into Chad to proceed via Tissi to Siki Kede (west of Vakaga prefecture), where Adam is usually based.⁴³ Arms are reportedly traded openly at Tissi's biweekly market.⁴⁴

65. In January 2017, Abdoulaye Hissène obtained significant amounts of military equipment coming from Ngarba, at the Chadian border, which later, via Akoursoulbak, were transported to Ndélé, Kaga Bandoro, Bria and Ippy (annex 5.5).⁴⁵ In Ouham prefecture, Mahamat Al-Khatim's MPC maintains its trafficking networks, and the border towns of Sido, Kabo and Markounda are regarded as main entry points for MPC.⁴⁶

66. On the border with the Sudan, arms smuggling continues through Am Dafok and surroundings.⁴⁷ Nourredine Adam's arrival in Ndélé on 25 April coincided with the entrance of two trucks from the Sudan, which offloaded military equipment at his residence in Ndélé, Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture (annex 5.5).

67. FPRC also appears to have revived its connections in South Sudan to acquire weaponry.⁴⁸ The Panel was informed that on 25 April, vehicles reportedly from South Sudan had delivered arms and ammunition to Issa Bachir in Ndélé (annex 5.6).

68. Additional information on FPRC and MPC arms trafficking operations is included in annexes 5.6 and 5.8.

Reported new foreign fighters from Chad and the Sudan

69. Ex-Séléka groups have accused one another of recruiting fighters across the borders in Chad and the Sudan (annex 5.7). UPC provided the Panel with identification cards of nationals of Chad that it reportedly had collected off the bodies of FPRC/MPC fighters (annex 5.8).

70. According to several sources, Moussa Assimeh, one of the most important Séléka generals in 2013 (S/2016/1032, para. 15), has been recruiting and introducing Sudanese armed fighters and weaponry into the country (annex 5.9).

⁴² Meeting with a confidential source, Bangui, 9 April 2017. Confidential documents, 1 and 2 March 2017.

⁴³ Meeting with prefect, sultan, civil society and MINUSCA, Birao and Am Dafock, 24 to 26 January 2017.

⁴⁴ Confidential sources, 3 February 2017.

⁴⁵ Meeting with a confidential source, Bangui, 12 April 2017.

⁴⁶ Telephone discussions with confidential sources, 15 January 2017. Meeting with a confidential source, Bangui 5 April 2017.

⁴⁷ Meeting with a confidential source, Bangui, 8 April 2017.

⁴⁸ Meeting with MINUSCA, Bangui, 9 April 2017; meeting with Hassan Bouba, Bambari, 11 April 2017.

Financial dimension of FPRC military efforts

71. FPRC leaders have continued to establish parallel administrations in their areas of influence. Since his return to Ndélé (Bamingui-Bangoran) in September 2016, Abdoulaye Hissène has consolidated the FPRC taxation system on all types of economic activities, including mining (annex 5.10).⁴⁹

72. In newly overtaken areas, FPRC has taken over some UPC sources of income, in particular mining sites in Nzacko, Ndassima and Bakouma. The intensity of the fighting in those towns, as well as in Agoudou Manga, Ouadja Ouadja and Yassin, is a testament to the importance that armed groups give to mining resources (annex 5.11). Since FPRC ousted UPC from Bria, the cattle market formerly located in the Fulani-dominated Gobolo neighbourhood has been replaced by one in the Bornou neighbourhood, where taxes are collected under the authority of FPRC "Commandant" Ali Abdel Karim.⁵⁰

C. UPC struggle for survival, arms-trafficking activities and recruitment of foreign fighters

73. Under pressure from the FPRC-led coalition, UPC revenues and arms supplies have dwindled. Consequently, though UPC criminal activities and attacks on villages continue (annex 5.12), the group's military operations have almost stalled. At the same time, the FPRC-led coalition has yet to take over the main UPC trafficking hubs, Béma, Satéma and Mobaye, along the Oubangui River (S/2016/1032, paras. 143-149). UPC thus continues to acquire arms and ammunition from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is essential to its survival.⁵¹ On 19 January 2017, the Panel received information regarding a planned shipment of 18,000 rounds of ammunition two days later by boat from Yakoma, Democratic Republic of the Congo, to Béma (annex 5.13). MINUSCA has no presence in the UPC-controlled town of Béma and surroundings that would have allowed for inspection and verification of that information (for the Panel's recommendation in this regard, see S/2016/694, para. 113 (c)).

74. UPC has also revived its connections in the Sudan and South Sudan to acquire weaponry through the Djema-Obo-Zémio-Mboki-Bangassou axis.⁵² On 8 December 2016, MINUSCA seized 27 AK-47 cartridges and over 6,478 rounds of ammunition from traffickers in Rafaï, two of whom are nationals of the Sudan (annex 5.14).⁵³

75. A video of UPC recapturing the town of Ndassima (Ouaka prefecture) in December 2016 shows that it was well-equipped (annex 5.15).⁵⁴ However, several sources reported that from March onwards, UPC had faced constrictions to rearm properly.⁵⁵ Finally, various FPRC members showed the Panel pictures of Chadian identification cards that they reportedly had removed from the bodies of foreign UPC fighters (annex 5.16).

⁴⁹ Panel's missions to Ndélé, 17 to 19 January 2017 and 11 to 13 April 2017.

⁵⁰ Meeting with the representative of Fulani in Gobolo, Bria, 11 April 2017; meeting with Ali Abdel Karim, Bria, 12 April 2017.

⁵¹ Confidential documents, 19 and 27 January 2017. Meeting with a confidential source, Bangassou, 10 June 2017.

⁵² Panel's mission to Obo and Kadjema, 6 to 10 April 2017. Meeting with intelligence and diplomatic sources, Bangui, 25 January 2017.

⁵³ Panel's mission to Bangassou, 8 to 13 June 2017.

⁵⁴ Video received from a confidential source, 10 January 2017.

⁵⁵ Meeting with a confidential source, "Bambari", 11 April 2017. Meeting with intelligence sources, Bangui, 16 June 2017.

D. Humanitarian impact of the fighting: the case of Bria

76. As a result of recent fighting, the humanitarian situation has deteriorated seriously, resulting in more than 50,000 new internally displaced persons in the east and 48,000 in the centre since January 2017.⁵⁶

77. Bria is one of the locations that have been the most seriously impacted. Several waves of fighting have taken place, including in November 2016 and May and June 2017 (see paras. 52-55). In addition, on 24 March, anti-balaka attacked the Fulani population of Koto Ville, a neighbourhood of the Gobolo enclave in Bria.⁵⁷

78. As a result of the hostilities in Bria, hundreds of houses were destroyed and more than 300 persons were killed. There are currently about 41,000 internally displaced persons in the city, which represents more than 85 per cent of the population.⁵⁸

E. Security vacuum in the far east

79. Since Ali Darassa's departure from Bambari, the fighting areas have further expanded towards the east and south-east. That trend represents a serious threat to civilians already threatened by LRA attacks (annex 5.17).

80. Meanwhile, the African Union Regional Task Force ceased its military operations against LRA at the end of April 2017, leaving a security vacuum in the area. Although the African Union decided to renew the mandate of the Task Force on 12 May 2017, the timing and the composition of the regional force, as well as the nature of FACA involvement, remain uncertain.

81. The gradual withdrawal of the Task Force has resulted in armed groups expanding control in the area (S/2016/1032, para. 126). A growing number of anti-balaka and UPC combatants are reportedly deployed on the Rafai-Zémio-Obo axis.⁵⁹

82. LRA combatants or some of the LRA splinter groups have also reportedly attacked MINUSCA and international forces. In late March, in an arms cache of an LRA splinter group apparently headed by Laworo, the Task Force found some communication radios and a blue helmet reportedly belonging to a Moroccan peacekeeper who had been attacked on 3 January 2017 on the Zémio-Rafai axis.⁶⁰ On 15 January, the same LRA group may have been responsible for an attack against a Uganda People's Defence Forces unit that was escorting a convoy on the road between Zémio and Mboki.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Protection Cluster Central African Republic, "Rapport sur les mouvements de populations", 31 May 2017. Available from https://gallery.mailchimp.com/9e62930dcaf29260cf72aa71f9/files/76237c72-3edc-4bd9-b21f-4fa566d0f7a1/Rapport_CMP_Mai_2017_Final.02.pdf.

⁵⁷ Meeting with a Fulani representative of internally displaced persons, Bria, 13 April 2017. Meeting with the personnel of the hospital, Bria, 12 April 2017.

⁵⁸ Protection Cluster Central African Republic, "Rapport sur les mouvements de populations".

⁵⁹ Confidential reports, 14 April, 16 May and 12 June 2017.

⁶⁰ Panel's mission to Obo, 6 to 10 April 2017.

⁶¹ Meetings with Uganda People's Defence Forces, United States forces and LRA defectors, Obo, 8 to 10 April 2017.

VI. Anti-balaka groups: dynamics, arms trafficking and funding

A. Understanding the anti-balaka and their pattern of mobilization

83. Since May 2015, anti-balaka elements have been formally divided into two groups. The duality between the Mokom and the Ngaïssona branches, however, does not reflect the complex functioning of that entity, which comprises a multiplicity of relatively independent local militias.

84. Anti-balaka cannot be considered to be armed groups in the same way as ex-Séléka factions. First, anti-balaka has no clear chain of command. The two leaders, Patrice-Édouard Ngaïssona and Maxime Mokom, have limited influence on the ground, as the allegiances of local anti-balaka elements change depending on various factors, including their assessment of each leader's capacity to facilitate access to disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation.⁶² In particular, Patrice-Édouard Ngaïssona has gradually removed himself from his anti-balaka base.⁶³

85. Secondly, even if local anti-balaka elements often express the same claims and use the same political rhetoric (such as the need to rearm FACA, anti-MINUSCA and anti-Muslim discourses), they have a wide variety of local objectives and interests. For example, the anti-balaka coordinator of Ouham prefecture, "Charly", told the Panel that he had refused to respond to calls to engage his men in the fighting in Ouaka prefecture in February 2017, arguing that he had had no interest in the fight.⁶⁴

86. Anti-balaka, ultimately, is a term that refers to a wide network of militias with mainly local agendas, which sometimes label themselves as self-defence groups. However, the various groups can be mobilized and coordinated on an ad hoc basis by actors with a different — and sometimes national — agenda. Such actors may provide anti-balaka groups with financial and logistical support to conduct actions against other armed groups, MINUSCA or specific communities. For instance, in Bria, in April 2017, members of the local self-defence group under Captain Hughes Tchumenga and anti-balaka from the Ouaka prefecture under Gaëtan Boadé, though separate entities usually working in different areas, collaborated under the guidance of FPRC, which provided them with support to attack UPC.⁶⁵ Subsequently, both groups fought against each other.

Attack on Bangassou (13 May 2017)

87. The anti-balaka attack on Bangassou was the result of a combination of such local and broader dynamics. On 13 May 2017, five days after the attack on peacekeepers in Yongofongo (see paras. 106-108), anti-balaka fighters, mainly from Bakouma and the Bangassou-Rafaï axis, attacked the Tokoyo neighbourhood and the MINUSCA base, resulting in 72 people killed, 76 injured and 4,400 displaced. Members of the Muslim community who were located inside the Catholic Church were specifically targeted after peacekeepers had to return to the MINUSCA base to protect it, leaving the Muslim community without protection.⁶⁶

⁶² Meetings with anti-balaka zone commanders and members, April to June 2017.

⁶³ Meetings with members of the Ngaïssona branch of anti-balaka, April to June 2017.

⁶⁴ Meeting with "Charly", Bossangoa, May 2017.

⁶⁵ Meeting with Hughes Tchumenga, Bria, 11 April 2017.

⁶⁶ Meeting with confidential sources, Bangassou, 12 June 2017. Meeting with a representative of the Muslim community, Bangui, 15 June 2017.

88. The Bangassou attack was the result of local tensions as well as economic and political rivalries. The relocation of UPC to the areas surrounding Bangassou was a source of frustration for some locals. In particular, the perception of preferential treatment given by UPC to Muslim merchants who were accused of foregoing the payment of tax at UPC checkpoints led to strong resentment.⁶⁷ This frustration was instrumentalized by some local community leaders and authorities, who described the entire Muslim community as UPC supporters.⁶⁸

89. At a broader level, political actors in Bangui also extended support to anti-balaka. Several sources told the Panel that the groups that had attacked Bangassou and the MINUSCA base were commanded by former FACA elements coming from the Ouaka prefecture, Boali and Bossangoa.⁶⁹ In the eyes of Bangui-based politicians, the presence of such anti-balaka groups in Bangassou is a buffer against the further expansion of ex-Séléka factions in the east.

B. Anti-balaka arms supplies

90. While anti-balaka fighters are mainly equipped with artisanal weapons and hunting ammunition, new supply networks (see map in annex 6.1), activated by anti-balaka independently or through ad hoc cooperation with the FPRC-led coalition, have yielded conventional military weaponry, mostly AK-type assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades.⁷⁰

91. In November 2016, four individuals who support the anti-balaka and two involved in the creation of the Mouvement de résistance pour la défense de la patrie (MRDP), Séraphin Koméya and Hans Nemandji III, met in Bangui to organize arms trafficking and recruitment of combatants in support of the FPRC-led coalition (annex 6.2). In mid-January 2017, Hans Nemandji and General Arda Hakouma (FPRC) also obtained weapons — including 60 mm and 120 mm mortar bombs — in Moyen Sido (Ouham Pende), on the border with Chad.

92. Arms and ammunition are also trafficked from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Congo across the Oubangui River and through Bangui's river port of Ouango (7th district). Traffickers informed the Panel that in December 2016, they had collected weapons in Géména (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and in May 2017, the authorities of the Central African Republic seized 6,000 rounds of hunting ammunition coming from Zongo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Port Beach, Bangui (annex 6.3). That type of ammunition, produced by the company MACC in Pointe Noire, Congo, is frequently observed by the Panel throughout the Central African Republic (annex 6.4). Other sources reported that since November 2016, weaponry had been loaded in vessels in the port of Impfondo, Congo, and delivered in Bangui.⁷¹

93. On 11 April, MINUSCA seized 11,275 rounds of MACC ammunition and 136 machetes in local shops in Bangassou, currently a major arms-trafficking hub, which were marketed by individuals coming from the Democratic Republic of the

⁶⁷ Meeting with a Bangassou community leader, Bangui, 16 June 2017.

⁶⁸ In October 2016, local authorities and religious leaders held a meeting to encourage the youth to create armed groups, stressing the UPC threat and the complicity of the Muslim community.

⁶⁹ Meeting with anti-balaka arrested in Bangassou, Bangui, 14 June. Meetings with confidential sources, Bangassou, 12 June.

⁷⁰ Meetings with confidential sources, Bangui, 7 and 11 April 2017. Confidential documents, 4 April 2017, 31 May and 4 and 5 June 2017.

⁷¹ Confidential reports, 8 November 2016 and 17 June 2017. Meeting with a confidential source, 20 May 2017.

Congo (annex 6.5).⁷² That seizure demonstrates that anti-balaka fighters have developed trafficking interests in Mbomou prefecture.

C. Anti-balaka funding: the case of the gold mine in Koro-Mpoko

94. Taking advantage of the weakness and sometimes complicity of local authorities in their areas of operations, anti-balaka continue to engage in illegal income-generating activities. For instance, in the north-west, the Ndalé brothers (see paras. 119-122) rely mainly on cattle rustling and trafficking.

95. The exploitation of natural resources also remains a potential source of revenue, as demonstrated by the case of the “Wili” gold mining site in Koro-Mpoko, about 50 kilometres south of Bossangoa. Since the discovery of gold around June 2016, Koro-Mpoko’s population is estimated to have grown from about 10,000 to 40,000 persons (see annex 6.6). The daily production of gold would now reach up to 2,500 grams.⁷³

96. The gold mining site is under the control of locals from Koro-Mpoko, with Guy Gbaguéné at the head of a hierarchical management system that comprises 5 to 10 artisanal miners and collects taxes on all production. Local anti-balaka are generating revenues through the following various ways at the site:

(a) As artisanal miners: Guy Martial Yankoïssé, alias “Capitaine Djapra”, is one such artisanal miner. He is also the former mayor and anti-balaka leader of Koro-Mpoko;⁷⁴

(b) As diggers and buyers: many anti-balaka combatants, including some from Bangui, go regularly to Koro-Mpoko;⁷⁵

(c) Through illegal taxation at checkpoints at the entrance to the site;

(d) As private security providers: artisanal miners have hired anti-balaka elements from Koro-Mpoko and Bossangoa to provide security. The presence of a significant number of weapons was confirmed by many eyewitnesses (annex 6.6).⁷⁶

97. National authorities recognize that they have very limited control over the situation in Koro-Mpoko. They acknowledge that elements of the Unité spéciale antifraude (USAF, or “mining brigade”) do not have the required means to impose their authority over armed groups and, to date, have been obliged to collaborate with them.⁷⁷

98. While the Government is carrying out a policy of sensitization vis-à-vis workers to combat trafficking, some locals involved in the management of the “Wili” site told the Panel that they would not allow the authorities of the Central African Republic to challenge their control over the mine.⁷⁸

⁷² Panel’s mission to Bangassou, 8 to 13 June 2017.

⁷³ Confidential document from the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water Resources, undated. Meeting with local authorities, Bossangoa and Koro-Mpoko, 9 and 10 May 2017.

⁷⁴ Meeting with “Charly”, Bossangoa, 9 May 2017.

⁷⁵ Meeting with an anti-balaka leader, Bangui, 19 May 2017. Confidential report, 1 April 2017.

⁷⁶ Meeting with a gendarmerie official, Bossangoa, 9 May 2017.

⁷⁷ USAF comprises only about 100 officers nationwide, with very limited weaponry. Meeting with a representative of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Mines, Energy and Water Resources, Bangui, 8 and 9 June 2017.

⁷⁸ Meetings with confidential sources, Bossangoa and Koro-Mpoko, 9 to 11 May 2017.

VII. Cross-border infiltration of foreign fighters between the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo

99. In its 2016 final report, the Panel raised the issue of an army officer of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Freddy Libeba Baongoli, who had arrived in Bangui in 2016 to prepare an insurrection against the national authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2016/1032, para. 17). On 9 June, Mr. Baongoli was arrested in Bangui, together with a fellow national, Alexandre Mitchiabu Mabiji. They identified themselves as members of a military-political group led by John Tchibangu, a former army colonel of the Democratic Republic of the Congo who deserted in 2012 and has since been planning an armed struggle in that country from Kampala.⁷⁹

100. Messrs. Baongoli and Mitchiabu claimed to have formed two battalions, including some FARDC soldiers based in Équateur province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁸⁰ According to them, a military operation was planned on 30 June 2017 from Gbadolite, Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁸¹

101. Messrs. Baongoli and Mitchiabu declared that they had been tasked to recruit between 500 and 1,000 Central African combatants, and that three-quarters of the recruits were located outside Bangui.⁸²

102. Former RPRC General Zoundeko, killed in February 2017, had supported Messrs. Baongoli and Mitchiabu in the mobilization of fighters and weapons.⁸³ In Bangui, several individuals close to RPRC and ex-Séléka worked for Messrs. Baongoli and Mitchiabu from 2014 onwards.⁸⁴ Mr. Baongoli was in possession of a Central African Republic passport with a false identity issued by Nourredine Adam when he was State Minister in charge of security (annex 7.1). On 11 June, Dido Ndud Koumalo, related to General Zoundeko, was also arrested in Bangui.

103. The Panel obtained a photo of new military uniforms shipped to Bangui with the label "Col. Libeba Boangoli NY Freddy" (annex 7.2). The Panel also obtained text messages sent on 14 April 2017 to Bangui-based individuals, including a detailed assessment of troops and weapons capacity (annex 7.3), according to which there were 683 men with 347 weapons ready to cross the border between the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Gbadolite.

104. At the time of drafting the present report, there was no evidence that the aforementioned nationals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were involved in operational fighting within the Central African Republic or that they brought weapons into the country. They rather appear to be using the territory of the Central African Republic as a recruitment base for their operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. However, Central African fighters mobilized by Mr. Baongoli have been involved in FPRC-led coalition military operations, of which 73 individuals are reported to have been killed.

⁷⁹ Confidential documents and records obtained by the Panel on 25 and 27 June 2017. Meeting with a confidential source, Bangui, 13 June 2017.

⁸⁰ Confidential documents obtained by the Panel on 27 June 2017.

⁸¹ Confidential documents and records obtained by the Panel on 25 and 27 June 2017.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Confidential documents and meetings with confidential sources, Bangui, 13 June 2017.

⁸⁴ Meeting with a confidential source, Bangui, 14 June 2017.

VIII. The humanitarian situation: growing violations of human rights and international humanitarian law

105. The Central African Republic is experiencing a dramatic deterioration in the humanitarian situation. In the last six months, there have been more than 100,000 new displaced persons, either internally or as refugees. As of May 2017, there were more than 500,000 internally displaced persons (about 10 per cent of the population, which represents the largest number since 2014) and 480,000 refugees.⁸⁵

A. Attacks against peacekeepers

106. Since the deployment of MINUSCA in September 2014, the first half of 2017 has been the deadliest period for the Mission regarding attacks against peacekeepers, with nine killed to date.⁸⁶

107. On 8 May 2017, MINUSCA suffered its largest number of casualties in a single attack. A convoy of Cambodian engineers and Moroccan soldiers was attacked by anti-balaka elements at a checkpoint in Yogofongo village (20 km from Bangassou).⁸⁷ The attack was conducted amid false rumours spread by locals, including politicians and local authorities, that peacekeepers were transporting armed Fulanis to Bangassou to help UPC gain control of the city. During the attack, some anti-balaka accused the peacekeepers of being "Muslims and friends of UPC" (annex 8.1).⁸⁸

108. During the attack, five peacekeepers were killed (4 Cambodians, 1 Moroccan) and eight were wounded (7 Moroccans, 1 Cambodian). On 13 May, another Moroccan peacekeeper was killed in Bangassou as the result of an attack by anti-balaka.

109. The Bangassou-Rafai-Zémio-Obo road, which borders the Democratic Republic of the Congo, has become a high-risk axis for civilians as well as peacekeepers. For example, on 3 January, two Mauritanian peacekeepers were killed and two others were injured following an ambush on a convoy about 60 km west of Obo.⁸⁹ On 14 April, UPC fighters also attacked peacekeepers in Zémio.⁹⁰

B. Attacks against non-governmental organizations

110. The Central African Republic continues to be one of the most dangerous places for humanitarian actors to operate.⁹¹ According to an international non-governmental organization (NGO), from January to June 2017, there were 123 incidents against NGOs in the country.⁹²

111. Some NGO staff told the Panel that they felt particularly at risk in areas where MINUSCA was absent. The Mission's strategy to deploy more military resources in major crisis areas, such as Bambari and Bangassou, and the related closing of some

⁸⁵ Protection Cluster Central African Republic, "Rapport sur les mouvements de populations" (see footnote 56).

⁸⁶ Confidential report, 18 May 2017.

⁸⁷ Panel's meeting with wounded peacekeepers, Bangui, 11 May 2017.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Confidential report, 4 January 2017.

⁹⁰ Confidential reports, 15 and 20 April 2017.

⁹¹ Confidential report, 25 June 2017.

⁹² International NGO Safety Organization, Central African Republic facts and figures database, Available from www.ngosafety.org/country/central_african_republic (accessed 23 June 2017).

temporary operational bases, has therefore affected NGO activities, leading several to suspend operations, for instance in Kabo, Ouham prefecture.⁹³

112. On 24 May 2017, an assailant forced two individuals out of the Médecins sans frontières hospital in Bangassou and executed them.⁹⁴ While that incident did not feature the direct targeting of NGO staff, it represents a major violation of international humanitarian law.

C. Conflict-related sexual violence

113. The Panel notes that sexual and gender-based violence, while representing a recurrent and widespread phenomenon in the entire country, continues to be underreported (annex 8.2).⁹⁵ Some sexual attacks were committed while the population was under the control of armed groups. For example, the Panel was informed of at least three cases of rape committed by alleged elements of the group Retour, réclamation, réhabilitation (3R) during their occupation of Niem, from 2 to 20 May 2017.⁹⁶

114. On 25 April, in Bocaranga, Ouham Pendé prefecture, Abba Rafael, then anti-balaka leader in Bozoum, Ouham-Pendé prefecture, together with his elements, kidnapped and raped 10 Muslim girls between 11 and 13 years of age.⁹⁷

D. The “School of Peace” or the “Ali Darassa School”

115. In Bambari, the Panel visited the École communautaire de la paix, also known as the “School of Peace” or the “Ali Darassa School”, headed by Ahmat Ali, who introduced himself as the UPC representative for humanitarian affairs and who has also acted as an adviser to UPC leader Ali Darassa.⁹⁸ He told the Panel that the funding of the school, which has been operational since March 2015, was provided by Ali Darassa.

116. According to its annual report, the school has received teaching materials and some basic furniture from the NGOs Triangle and Save the Children, and from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Children’s Fund (annex 8.3), because the school was initially the only one open to internally displaced persons in Bambari.

117. The inspector of the Ministry of Education in the region⁹⁹ acknowledged being aware that the school was funded by Mr. Darassa. Considering that the school helps social cohesion, she visited it unofficially and provided some materials and furniture.

118. The Panel considers that the foregoing case very well illustrates how armed groups may use humanitarian activities to seek legitimacy among communities.

⁹³ Confidential reports, 9, 11, 14 and 22 April, and 3 and 12 May 2017.

⁹⁴ Confidential report, 25 May 2017.

⁹⁵ Panel’s meeting with humanitarian organizations, May to June 2017.

⁹⁶ Confidential source, 2 June 2017, and confidential report, 13 June 2017.

⁹⁷ Confidential report, 26 April 2017 Meetings with confidential sources, 15 and 18 May 2017.

⁹⁸ Panel’s meeting with Ahmat Ali, Bambari, 30 May 2017.

⁹⁹ Meeting with Patricia-Olga Sanwe, Bambari, 9 June 2017.

E. Humanitarian consequences of violence in the north-west

119. The robbery of Fulani-owned cattle by anti-balaka groups under the control of the Ndalé brothers comes in the background of killings, kidnappings and sexual abuse.¹⁰⁰ At the same time, 3R elements attacked civilians perceived to be supporters of the Ndalé brothers, for instance in Bocaranga, on 2 February 2017,¹⁰¹ and during the occupation of Niem by 3R (2 to 20 May).¹⁰²

120. In Bocaranga, on 2 February 2017, 3R elements destroyed at least 35 houses and shops, and vandalized Bocaranga's church.¹⁰³ At least 18 people were killed, while an estimated 9,000 new internally displaced persons were forced to seek shelter outside the city.¹⁰⁴

121. The occupation of Niem by 3R resulted in thousands of new internally displaced persons,¹⁰⁵ the destruction and pillage of houses and the killing of more than 70 persons (annex 8.4).¹⁰⁶ At the time of the Panel's visit to Niem, the local hospital was occupied by more than 500 internally displaced persons. Fighters from 3R also attacked and destroyed villages on the Bocaranga-Koui axis (annex 8.5).

122. Information about other humanitarian issues, including the occupation of schools by armed groups and children associated with armed groups, is included in annex 8.6.

IX. Developments related to the Kimberley Process

123. Since the partial lifting of the Kimberley Process in June 2015 (S/2016/694, paras. 106-111), five sub-prefectures have been declared compliant (Berbérati, Boda, Carnot, Gazi and Nola), enabling production from those areas to be exported.

124. A forensic audit of the rough diamond stockpiles accumulated by buying houses during the crisis will soon be conducted by a contracted company to assess the place and date of their sourcing and thereafter decide on the possibility of exporting them. On that matter, the Panel reiterates that pursuant to Security Council resolution 2134 (2014) and subsequent resolutions, providing support for armed groups through the illicit exploitation of natural resources is a sanctionable act. In that regard, individuals and entities having purchased diamonds from areas under the control of armed groups may be subject to sanctions.

125. In its final report of December 2016 (S/2016/1032, paras. 230-238), the Panel underlined the fact that in some of the compliant zones, freedom of movement, which is one of the three requirements to assess whether a zone is compliant, was often limited to the major towns of Berbérati, Sosso-Nakombo, Carnot and Nola.

126. In June 2017, the Panel visited Boda, another sub-prefecture that was declared compliant. Although there remains an internally displaced persons camp with about 200 to 300 individuals, the Panel observed that the security situation facilitates

¹⁰⁰ Panel's meeting with General Sidiki, Koui, 18 May 2017.

¹⁰¹ Panel's missions to Bocaranga, 14 January and 18 May 2017.

¹⁰² Panel's mission to Niem, 16 May 2017.

¹⁰³ E-mail correspondence with an eyewitness in Bocaranga, 6 February 2017. Confidential reports, 3 to 5 February 2017.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Confidential report, 25 May 2017.

¹⁰⁶ Panel's mission to Niem, 16 May 2017. Confidential report, 13 June 2017. Meetings with representatives of internally displaced persons, 16 to 19 May 2017.

relatively safe movement.¹⁰⁷ However, owing to the latent anti-balaka presence, freedom of movement of the Muslim community is clearly constrained in the neighbouring sub-prefecture of Boganda, where the presence of the State remains very limited (there are two gendarmes and no USAF based in Boganda). Access to mines, in particular, is allegedly denied to Muslims in sites around Boganda and Bodjoula.¹⁰⁸

X. Recommendations

127. The Panel recommends that the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013) concerning the Central African Republic:

(a) Encourage all mediators to identify and include in peace talks individuals who have a real capacity to exert influence on the ground and implement the commitments they make, recalling in this regard that, pursuant to paragraph 10 (c) of Security Council resolution 2339 (2017), and upon approval by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2127 (2013), listed individuals can travel to take part in meetings that further the objectives of peace and national reconciliation;

(b) Encourage the national authorities of the Central African Republic, at the highest level, to ensure that all funds, financial assets and economic resources of listed individuals and entities be frozen without delay, pursuant to paragraph 12 of resolution 2339 (2017);

(c) Encourage MINUSCA, in collaboration with the authorities of the Central African Republic and those of neighbouring countries, to take effective action as soon as there is reliable information on arms trafficking activities, allowing the weaponry to be seized and inspected;

(d) Encourage Member States to carefully respect the notification and exemptions procedures and to coordinate with MINUSCA when providing operational and non-operational training to the security forces of the Central African Republic, including to the presidential security guard;

(e) Encourage the authorities of the Central African Republic, in collaboration with MINUSCA, to provide, in the context of the ongoing security sector reform process, national security forces, including the Unité spéciale antitraffice, with the required and appropriate training and resources so that they can participate efficiently in the fight against the illicit trafficking of natural resources;

(f) Encourage MINUSCA, through its forensic police unit, to continue to take all the measures necessary to safeguard any evidence related to violations of human rights and international law.

¹⁰⁷ Panel's mission to Boda, 10 June 2017. The Panel met, *inter alia*, with the vice-mayor of Boda, representatives of the youth, Muslim collectors and imams.

¹⁰⁸ Meeting with imams and Muslim collectors, Boda, 10 June 2017.

Annexes

Annexes to the final report of the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2339 (2017)

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Annex 2.1: Calls for a Global political agreement by FPRC and the Mokom branch of anti-balaka.

1) FPRC's statement delivered during the 20 April 2017 meeting of the Advisory and Monitoring Committee on DDRR.

Available at <https://www.facebook.com/sango.darelkout/posts/193745807810165>
Posted on 25 April 2017

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE
DE CENTRAFRIQUE CE. T. RAFRIQ CENTRAFRIQUE
BUREAU EXECUTIF NATIONAL
COORDINATION
N° _____ FPRC BEN PR 017
République Centrafricaine
Unité - Dignité - Travail

ALLOCUTION DU REPRESENTANT DU FPRC (LAMBERT MOUKOVE) A L'OCCASION DE LA CEREMONIE D'OUVERTURE DE LA 4EME REUNION DU CCS

Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République Chef de l'Etat,
Honorables Messieurs le Président de l'Assemblée Nationale,
Excellence Monsieur le Premier Ministre Chef du Gouvernement,
Mesdames et Messieurs les Membres du Gouvernement,
Excellences Messieurs les Ambassadeurs et Chefs des Missions Diplomatiques et Consulaires accrédités en République Centrafricaine,
Distingués Invités,
Mesdames, Messieurs

Au nom du Bureau Politique du Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique et de tous les Combattants, nous saisissons cette occasion, pour témoigner toutes nos gratitude et nos reconnaissances à l'endroit de la Communauté Internationale pour ses interventions incessantes dans la résolution de la crise Centrafricaine.

Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat,

La participation du FPRC à la réunion du Comité Consultatif et du Suivi du Programme National du DDRR, constitue une opportunité d'explorer les possibilités de recherche de solutions pour le retour de la Paix Durable, la Sécurité, la préservation de l'Unité et la Réconciliation Nationale.

Excellence, Monsieur le Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat,

Depuis la tenue du Forum National de Bangui, le FPRC avait dénoncé l'Accord sur les Principes du DDRR signé le 10 Mai 2015 avec les différents groupes Armés pour les raisons suivantes :

- 1- Certaines dispositions prévues dans cet Accord notamment les Articles 6 alinéa 1 et l'Article 7, relatifs aux conditions d'éligibilité des combattants à la démobilisation et de recrutement au sein des forces armées ne répondent pas aux attentes des combattants du FPRC ;
- 2- Les dispositions de l'article 9 qui prévoient la consultation préalable de tous les groupes armés avant la mise en place de la coordination n'ont pas été respectées
- 3- Le Manque d'initiatives et d'Ouverture Politique des dirigeants, qui se caractérisent par le non-respect des engagements solennels souscrits entre les groupes Armés et le Gouvernement ;

- 4- Le manque de bonne volonté du Gouvernement à œuvrer réellement en faveur de la Paix, la Cohésion Sociale, le vivre ensemble et l'égalité de tous devant les charges publiques.

Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République Chef de l'Etat :

Depuis Décembre 2015, le Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de Centrafrique (FPRC) a exprimé sa bonne volonté en apportant ses contributions salutaires au déroulement des opérations électorales et du processus en cours pour le règlement pacifique du désaccord Politique.

Malgré les actions salvatrices consenties par le FPRC pour la sortie définitive de la crise, la Direction Politique est désagréablement surprise que des campagnes Médiaques mensongères : d'incitation à la haine et à la violence sont régulièrement diffusées en vue de détourner l'Opinion tant Nationale qu'Internationale des objectifs réels recherchés par le Mouvement : qui n'est d'ailleurs que le rétablissement de la justice et de l'équilibre sociopolitique entre les différentes régions du pays.

Le FPRC a décidé aujourd'hui de participer aux réunions du Comité Consultatif et du Suivi du programme National du DDRR, non seulement pour rompre avec ses velléités mensongères, mais plutôt apporter des Contributions aux grandes orientations de la Politique Générale de la Résolution de la Crise que traverse notre cher et beau pays la République Centrafricaine.

Excellence Monsieur le Président de la République, Chef de l'Etat :

En égard à tout ce qui précède, le FPRC conditionne sa participation effective au processus du DDRR à la SIGNATURE PREALABLE D'UN ACCORD POLITIQUE qui sera suivi d'une révision des dispositions de l'accord de principe dénoncées ci-haut.

Le Bureau Politique du FPRC par ma voix : réitère sa ferme volonté et son entière disponibilité à renouer les contacts en vue de la recherche d'une Paix Durable et du retour définitif de la sécurité dans notre pays.

Vive la République Centrafricaine :

Vive le Peuple Centrafricain :

Et Vive la Paix en Centrafrique :

JE VOUS REMERCIE

- 2) List of claims of the Mokom branch of anti-balaka. Document shared with the Panel by Maxime Mokom on 21 January 2017.

See point 4 regarding the call for national dialogue.

LES REVENDICATIONS DES PATRIOTES ANTI-BALAKA

PREAMBULE

Nous Patriotes ANTI-BALAKA, groupe Auto-défense et de résistance populaire, filles et fils de la République Centrafricaine :

ATTACHES à la définition classique des principes à partir des postulats du Préambule et des premiers articles de la Chartes des Nations-Unies réaffirmant le respect du principe de l'égalité des droits des peuples et de leurs droits à disposer d'eux-mêmes :

ATTACHES à une volonté de réconciliation nationale, à la vigilance et à une vision basée sur des valeurs et principes universels pour : une République Centrafricaine unie, indivisible et souveraine, prospère, forte et fondée sur le strict respect des principes de coexistence pacifique entre les communautés et confessions, aux respects des droits de l'homme et de l'état de droit :

CONSIDERANT que la sécurité, la paix et la stabilité sont essentielles pour le développement durable de notre pays ;

CONSIDERANT que les Patriotes Anti-Balaka ont démontré leurs capacités à renverser la situation et se présentent aujourd'hui de manière irréversible comme une force avec laquelle il faut compter ; leurs principales revendications se résument en 15 points énumérés ci-après :

PRINCIPALES REVENDICATIONS

1- Tous les droits universellement reconnus et respectés ^{Partout} partout dans le monde, en Asie, en Europe, en Amérique, en Océanie, entre autre, ceux énumérés en annexe (page3), sont ces mêmes droits dont nous demandons l'application et le respect en République Centrafricaine.

2- Demandons la libération des Patriotes Anti-Balaka arrêtés et détenus arbitrairement.

- 3- Nous tenons à nous impliquer fermement et prendre par pleinement dans tous les processus et système de consolidation de paix, de gouvernance et de reconstruction durable de notre pays, gage de stabilité. Car, la gouvernance et le devenir de la République Centrafricaine ne peut désormais se jouer sans notre implication.
- 4- La tenue d'un dialogue national inclusif.
- 5- Le départ des mercenaires étrangers.
- 6- La définition consensuelle de la stratégie de la conduite du DDRR/RSS/RN.
- 7- Le réarmement des forces de défense et de sécurité disponibles.
- 8- La Reconnaissance de l'héroïsme des Patriotes Anti-balaka comme mouvement de résistance.
- 9- L'Octroi de promotion à titre exceptionnel aux éléments des Forces de défense et de sécurité ayant intégré le mouvement des Anti-Balaka.
- 10- L'incorporation des Anti-balaka dans les forces de défense et de sécurité ainsi que dans les politiques globales de reconstruction du pays.
- 11- Prise en charge des Anti-Balaka mutilés, les laissés pour compte, les orphelins et veuves, tous, victimes de la crise Centrafricaine.
- 12- L'édification de monument à la mémoire des patriotes Anti-Balaka tombés sur les champs de la résistance.
- 13- L'exhumation de corps des Patriotes Anti-Balaka tombés sur les champs de la résistance et leur inhumation en un lieu identifié.
- 14- L'édification de musées dans les grandes villes de la RCA en leur mémoire et à la mémoire de ceux ou celles tombés sur le champ de la résistance.
- 15- Le dédommagement des victimes de la crise Centrafricaine.

Fait à Bangui le, 07 Décembre 2016

Le Coordonnateur National des Patriotes Anti-Balaka

Maxime MOKOM

Annex 2.2: Initiative for peace of the President of the National Assembly.

On 26 May 2017, the Speaker of Parliament, Karim Meckassoua, presented the Parliament's initiative for peace (see document below). Designed as a recommendation to guide the Government's efforts for peace, the initiative, according to the Speaker, aims to remind CAR Government that impunity for war crimes is not an option.¹

In the context of tensions between the executive and the legislative branches of the Government, the initiative also aims to underline the need for the Government and the Presidency to better take into account the position of the National Assembly. In turn, certain individuals in the Government consider that the Parliament is overstepping its prerogatives.²

Document shared with the Panel by M. Meckassoua on 8 June 2017.

INITIATIVE PARLEMENTAIRE POUR L'ADOPTION D'UN PLAN DE PAIX EN REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE RECOMMANDATION

LA REPRESENTATION NATIONALE

1. *Constatant* que la crise centrafricaine perdure en dépit du retour à l'ordre constitutionnel par l'élection du Président de la République et la mise en place de l'Assemblée nationale ;
2. *Constatant également* le renforcement de la capacité militaire des groupes armés avec pour conséquences la reprise des combats inter-groupes et l'accroissement des exactions sur la population civile ;
3. *Considérant surtout* que la Paix est un besoin vital pour le peuple centrafricain et une exigence nationale primordiale à laquelle chaque Institution nationale et chaque citoyen doit contribuer ;
4. *Appréciant les efforts* déployés par le Président de la République et le Gouvernement avec l'appui de la MINUSCA et des partenaires institutionnels de la République Centrafricaine pour le rétablissement véritable de la sécurité et la restauration de l'autorité de l'Etat sur l'ensemble du territoire ainsi que la réconciliation nationale, tels qu'exprimés dans la stratégie nationale de Désarmement, Démobilisation, Réintégration et Expatriement (DDRE) ;
5. *Prenant acte* de l'Initiative Africaine de Paix pour la République centrafricaine, présentée au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies le 24 mars 2017 ;
6. *Estimant* que la recherche d'une Paix durable doit nécessairement prendre en compte la volonté du peuple centrafricain ainsi l'impératif de réconciliation nationale et les justes exigences de justice et de réparation ; les victimes devant être placées au centre de la construction de la Paix ;

¹ Meeting with Karim Meckassoua, Bangui, 8 June 2017.

² Meeting with a Government minister referring to Cabinet's discussions, Bangui, 18 June 2017.

7. *Se référant* aux recommandations du Forum national de Bangui ; à la Constitution centrafricaine du 30 mars 2016; aux Résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies et, spécialement, aux Résolutions 2169 (2014) et 2301 (2016) relatives à la République centrafricaine ainsi qu'à la Résolution 2282 (2016) du Conseil de sécurité et de l'Assemblée générale des Nations-Unies fixant une nouvelle approche pour une Paix durable ; à la Loi organique n° 15003 du 3 juin 2015 instituant une Cour pénale spéciale pour la République centrafricaine ; aux standards internationaux en matière d'Etat de droit, de protection des droits humains, de démocratie, de bonne gouvernance bonne et de justice équitable ;

La Représentation nationale prend la présente initiative, qu'elle recommande au Gouvernement de faire sienne, en tant qu'ensemble de principes et de mesures déclinées comme suit.

PRINCIPES

PRINCIPE 1 : Afin de parvenir à une Paix durable en République centrafricaine, le projet de Paix doit être, en ses principes et en ses modalités, conforme aux aspirations et au vouloir vivre ensemble exprimés par le peuple centrafricain.

Dans cet esprit, la Représentation nationale,

- a) Considère que le processus de Paix se doit d'avoir pour cadre de référence les recommandations adoptées à l'issue du Forum national de Bangui de mai 2015;
- b) Rappelle que ce Forum a connu la participation de représentants du Peuple Centrafricain en toutes ses composantes; que les recommandations adoptées prennent appui sur des consultations à la base qui ont permis aux centrafricains de s'exprimer; et que les Représentants au Forum ont entendu que lesdites recommandations servent de cadre pour un retour à la paix ;
- c) Considère également qu'une telle référence au Forum de Bangui et à la responsabilité des institutions centrafricaines n'exclut pas que des Pays frères ou Organisations amies puissent appuyer le processus décidé par les institutions centrafricaines ;

- d) Considère enfin, comme implication nécessaire de ce principe, que le Plan de Paix étant une manifestation du vouloir vivre ensemble de tous les centrafricains, aucune composante partielle du Peuple centrafricain, et notamment les groupes armés, ne peut s'arroger le pouvoir de l'exprimer sans son consentement ;
- e) Et que, conformément aux Recommandations du Forum de Bangui, le Plan de Paix doit traduire une juste et raisonnable articulation entre les exigences de réconciliation nationale et de justice pour les victimes.

PRINCIPE 2 : La conduite du processus de paix et la recherche de solutions, notamment institutionnelles, doivent être respectueuses de l'ordre constitutionnel centrafricain.

La Représentation nationale considère, en conséquence,

- a) Que l'initiative du Plan de Paix dans un contexte de retour à l'ordre constitutionnel normal revient à toutes les bonnes volontés, mais prioritairement aux Institutions centrafricaines représentants légitimes du peuple centrafricain, au premier rang desquelles le Pouvoir exécutif ;
- b) Que le pilotage du processus de Paix est de la responsabilité de l'exécutif, celui-ci procédant dans ce cadre aux consultations qu'il juge pertinentes et appropriées ;
- c) Que le Plan de Paix prend la forme d'une Loi, proposée par le Gouvernement ;
- d) Que les autorités exécutives chargées de conduire le processus de Paix doivent informer la Représentation nationale et les citoyens centrafricains de son évolution ;
- e) Que toute idée de dévolution ou de partage du pouvoir en dehors des règles constitutionnelles doit être exclue.

PRINCIPE 3 – Le processus de Paix met en œuvre des mesures tendant au retour de la paix dans le respect des droits de victimes, des principes essentiels du droit international, notamment humanitaire et pénal, ainsi que du cadre international de paix tel qu'établi par les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité.

La représentation nationale considère, en application de ce principe,

- a) Que la mesure centrale du processus est un accord de Paix conclu au terme d'une négociation ayant pour objet le rétablissement de la sécurité des populations, la réconciliation nationale et le redéploiement de l'État ;
- b) Que les représentants des victimes de la crise doivent être parties prenantes aux négociations de Paix ;
- c) Que les négociations ont pour préalable un cessez-le feu permettant le rétablissement de la libre circulation sur le territoire dans les meilleurs délais ;
- d) Que les crimes relevant des statuts de la Cour pénale internationale (CPI) et de la Cour pénale spéciale (CPS) ne sont pas amnistiables ;
- e) Que la juste réparation des victimes doit constituer un élément central de la solution à la crise ;
- f) Que, sous réserve des mesures de contrainte dans le cadre du maintien du cessez le feu, les mesures non judiciaires prises à l'égard des combattants (localisation géographique, déplacement, rapatriement, enrôlement pour travaux d'intérêt général, etc.) n'affectent pas leurs droits garantis par la Loi, notamment leur droit essentiel au respect de leur intégrité physique et morale ;
- g) Que les procédures judiciaires et parajudiciaires respectent le droit à un procès équitable des personnes accusées.

EN CONSÉQUENCE DE QUOI, LA REPRÉSENTATION NATIONALE RECOMMANDE LES MESURES SUIVANTES, EN TANT QU'ÉLÉMENTS D'UN PLAN POUR UNE PAIX DURABLE EN RÉPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE.

PLAN DE PAIX - MESURES TECHNIQUES

A) Négociations et Accord de Paix

1. Une Loi votée par l'Assemblée nationale à l'initiative du Gouvernement constitue le Plan de Paix. Cette Loi précise notamment la composition de la structure de négociation, les axes de la négociation, et arrête les principes. Elle inclut les éléments de la présente initiative, ainsi que les éléments pertinents des processus en cours (DDRR, RSS, etc.) ;
2. Le plus haut niveau de transparence et de rigueur doit être assuré tout au long du processus, dans le respect du secret des négociations. L'information du public est de la responsabilité du Gouvernement ;
3. Les négociations ont lieu à Bangui et, sous réserve que les conditions logistiques et de sécurité soient réunies, dans d'autres villes du pays. Le Groupe de négociation en décide ;
4. Les négociations sont conduites par les représentants du Gouvernement. Ils associent, en fonction des questions traitées ou des régions géographiques concernées des Députés de l'Assemblée Nationale ;
5. Une expertise nationale et internationale est mise à la disposition des Parties à la négociation ;
6. Le Gouvernement informe régulièrement l'Assemblée Nationale de l'état d'avancement des négociations ;
7. L'Accord de Paix signé par les parties est soumis à l'Assemblée Nationale pour son approbation. Il prend alors la forme d'une Loi ordinaire et est appliquée comme telle. Cette Loi n'affecte ni la dévolution du pouvoir, ni l'organisation des institutions telles qu'elles sont prévues par la Constitution. Toutefois, les négociations de paix peuvent porter sur la possibilité et les conditions de la participation des membres des organisations politico-militaires à la vie politique, y compris par la création de partis politiques ;

8. Le Gouvernement prend dans les meilleurs délais toutes les mesures nécessaires à l'application de la Loi portant Accord de Paix.

B) Comité National des Victimes

1. Un comité national, dit « Comité National des Victimes », est créé afin de placer les victimes et la réparation de leurs préjudices au centre du processus ;
2. Le Comité national des Victimes est composé de représentants désignés par les Comités de Paix et de réconciliation au niveau préfectoral ;
3. Le Comité National des Victimes est représenté au sein du Groupe de négociation de l'Accord de Paix ;
4. La protection des membres du Comité national des Victimes est une priorité ;
5. Les personnes réfugiées et déplacées internes sont représentées au sein du Comité des Victimes ;
6. Le Comité des Victimes vérifie régulièrement que ses représentants au sein du Groupe de Négociation remplissent correctement leurs mandats.

C) Cessez-le-feu

1. En préalable des négociations, un accord de cessez-le feu est signé par les groupes armés pour toute la durée des négociations. Seuls les signataires de cet accord peuvent participer aux négociations ;
2. La violation de l'accord de cessez-le-feu par un groupe armé entraîne automatiquement l'exclusion de celui-ci des négociations, l'adoption à son égard des mesures coercitives qui s'imposent et l'engagement de poursuites judiciaires à l'égard des responsables.

K) Comités de Paix et de Réconciliation

1. Pendant la durée des négociations, des Comités de Paix et de Réconciliation sont mis en place, sur une base sous-préfectorale, afin d'œuvrer concrètement au retour de la confiance et de la concorde intercommunautaire ;
2. Les Comités de Paix et de Réconciliation sont composés de représentants des différents segments de la société civile, assistés des autorités locales et du ou des députés de la localité considérée, agissant comme observateurs ;
3. Les Comités de Paix et de Réconciliation sont présidés par une personnalité de la société civile choisie en leur sein ; ils agissent en concertation avec les autorités locales ;
4. Les Comités de Paix et de Réconciliation informent de leurs activités le Gouvernement, l'Assemblée nationale et le Groupe de négociation.

Annex 2.3: Excerpts from the document signed by ex-Séléka leaders, including Nourredine Adam, in Benguela (Angola) on 15 December 2016.

Document obtained by the Panel on 11 January 2017 from a confidential source.

3. Ce Comité mis en œuvre aura la responsabilité de la planification rigoureuse et de la mise en œuvre diligente du DDP et du cantonnement, appuiera aussi les demandes recevables des ex-groupes belligérants, dont entre autres, un examen hiérarchisé en vue de leur suppression ou de la suspension des sanctions et des restrictions de liberté de mouvement de leurs chefs devenus, par le présent rapport, partenaires fiables dans la reconstruction du pays, de la paix et de la réconciliation;

4. Fas devoir de vérité, de justice et de mémoire pour les dizaines de milliers de victimes innocentes des différents conflits en RCA, une commission «Vérité - Justice - Réconciliation» sera mise en place et aura un mandat de douze (12) mois pour rendre compte à la nation et à la communauté internationale des résultats des ses investigations sur ce qui s'était passé en RCA, en particulier, dans la crise récente;


5. la reconnaissance des crimes avérés contre l'humanité et des crimes de guerre et l'acte de situer les responsabilités sont des conditions à la fois d'une non - répétition de l'histoire, mais aussi un acte de repentance et de respect pour la mémoire des victimes;

6. Les autorités légitimes de la RCA doivent amnistier les crimes de guerre comme solution politique et juridique de la résolution des différends;

SIGNATURES:

PAR LE GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DE L'ANGOLA


DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL DU SIE, ANDRÉ DE OLIVEIRA JOÃO
SANGO **LIEUTENANT-GÉNÉRAL**




17-11-2017

PAR LES GROUPES ARMÉS DU MOUVEMENT SETEPA


LE GÉNÉRAL NOURADINE ADAM




LE GÉNÉRAL AL-KHATIM MAMAMAT



LE GÉNÉRAL DAMANT ZAKARIA




LE GÉNÉRAL HISSSEINE KOURSI



TÉMOIN/FACILITATEUR

SEYDOU ABDELHAMID ASSADICK AL-MAHADI



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Annex 2.4: The Rome Agreement of 19 June 2017

« Entente de Sant'Egidio »

ACCORD POLITIQUE POUR LA PAIX EN REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE

Nous, représentants de SE M. Faustin A. Tondaga, Président de la République Chef de l'Etat, et du Gouvernement de la République Centrafricaine,

Représentants de tous les groupes politico-militaires du Pays, provenant de toutes les régions, représentants toutes ses composantes dans leur diversité,

Réunis à Rome sous la médiation de la Communauté de Sant'Egidio, qui s'engage sans relâche depuis des années pour la paix en Centrafrique,

En présence de délégations centrafricaines représentant l'Assemblée Nationale et la classe politique,

En présence de l'émissaire de SE le Cardinal Nzapalanga, archevêque de Bangui,

En présence du Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies en République Centrafricaine, M. Patrick Oluwajo-Ajayana,

En présence des représentants de l'Union Européenne, de la Communauté internationale et du Gouvernement Italien,

Préambule

Conscients de la situation de crise que traverse notre Patrie, et de la nécessité de mettre fin à la violence et de la mener définitivement vers sa renaissance et sa reconstruction ;

Conscients des efforts qu'ils ont déployés, nous remercions les Nations Unies, l'Union Africaine, la CEEAC, la CEMAC, l'Union Européenne, la CIRGL, l'OCI et l'ECOW et l'ensemble de la communauté internationale pour instaurer la stabilité en République Centrafricaine,

Nous remercions aussi tous ceux qui ont menés des efforts pour la réconciliation en République Centrafricaine et particulièrement leurs Excellences les Présidents Idriss Deby Itno, Denis Sassou Nguesso, Paul Biya, Ali Bongo Ondimba, Idriss Othman Nguema Mbasogo et José Eduardo dos Santos, leurs Excellences Alpha Condé, Président en exercice de l'Union Africaine, et Moussa Faki, Président de la Commission de l'Union Africaine,

Considérant que les souffrances du peuple centrafricain sont grandes et que tous doivent agir pour bîer le bien commun au delà des divergences politiques légitimes ;

Conscients de la nécessité de placer les victimes au centre des préoccupations afin que réparation soit faite;

Considérant que l'une des premières grandes ressources du Pays est représentée par son peuple tolérant, pacifique et laborieux ;

Décidés à contribuer à la consolidation d'une société unie, fraternelle et solidaire ;

Ensemble, nous réaffirmons

- Notre attachement à l'histoire, à l'intégrité territoriale, aux valeurs et principes constitutionnels de la République, à la démocratie, aux droits de l'homme, à la liberté de croyance et de culte;
- Le droit et devoir de toutes les forces vives de la Nation, à participer à l'édification d'un Pays prospère et indépendant et de garantir la participation politique et citoyenne de tous, dans tous les secteurs sociaux et politiques, sans distinction de religion et appartenance ethnique ou régionale ;
- Que les droits des personnes à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité sont sacrés et inviolables pour tout citoyen et pour toute personne vivant sur notre territoire, y compris les travailleurs humanitaires internationaux et les casques bleus, et qu'ils doivent être défendus par la loi ;

Nous nous engageons :

1. Sur le plan politique

a la mise en place immédiate de la part des groupes politico-militaires d'un cessez-le-feu sur toute l'étendue du territoire national, sous le contrôle de la communauté internationale, comme étape fondamentale sur le chemin de la paix définitive, par la cessation de tout type d'hostilité ;

Le gouvernement se charge d'obtenir la représentativité des groupes politico-militaires à tous les niveaux relatifs aux DDRR, Réforme du Secteur Sécuritaire et Réconciliation Nationale, la prise en charge des leaders des groupes par le Programme National du DDRR et l'ajustement des indemnités des représentants au CCS, afin de réaliser une meilleure coordination entre les Nations Unies, les mouvements politico-militaires et les autres institutions internationales sur le DDRR, afin de contribuer à la mise en œuvre des autres programmes de reconstruction du Pays et de faciliter le rôle de l'Assemblée Nationale sur la gestion du processus ;

au respect des autorités légitimes, issues des élections législatives et présidentielles de 2016;

- à la reconnaissance des groupes politico-militaires comme partie prenante de la reconstruction, une fois engagés dans un processus de transformation en partis et mouvements politiques, qui aboutira à l'enregistrement de nouvelles formations politiques dans le cadre légal de l'Etat;
- à travailler pour bâtir une dynamique de réconciliation dans tout le Pays, en collaboration avec toutes les institutions politiques légitimes, les autorités traditionnelles et religieuses et avec l'appui de la communauté internationale.
- Sur la base du contenu du présent accord, le gouvernement de la République Centrafricaine, ensemble avec le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général, s'engage à entamer une consultation sur la levée des sanctions pour les personnalités centrafricaines sanctionnées, qui relève du Comité des sanctions du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies ;
- Sur les questions de justice et de réparation, le présent accord, prenant en compte :
 - o les recommandations du Forum de Bangui en la matière,
 - o le travail de la Cour Pénale Internationale et de la Cour Pénale Spéciale,
 - o le droit de grâce du Président de la République,

décide l'institution d'une Commission « Vérité, Justice et Réconciliation », avec un mandat de 12 mois, laquelle, après avoir acquis toute la documentation existante en la matière et procédé aux auditions qu'elle jugera utiles, produira des recommandations à remettre au Président de la République et à exposer devant l'Assemblée nationale, portant sur les questions suivantes:

- Le traitement traditionnel sur les cas de réparation et pardon,
- La réinsertion des leaders et cadres relevant des groupes politico-militaires,
- La libération de combattants détenus,
- L'adoption de lois sur la réconciliation nationale, gage de confiance, d'apaisement et de stabilité.

2. Sur le plan sécuritaire :

- à la réouverture du territoire national à la libre circulation des personnes et des biens avec la levée des barrières illégales comme conséquence immédiate du cessez-le-feu,
- à la restauration de l'autorité de l'Etat sur toute l'étendue du territoire national par le biais du retour des autorités administratives et la mise en place d'un mécanisme conjoint de sécurité,
- à l'insertion, après sélection suivant des critères préétablis et suite à une phase de mise à niveau, de membres des groupes politico-militaires dans les forces de défense, les corps habillés ainsi qu'à la régularisation consensuelle de la situation

des anciens militaires ayant intégré les groupes politico-militaires, afin de reconstituer leurs carrières ;

à la sécurisation des couloirs de transhumance et la protection de la faune ;

3. Sur le plan économique, humanitaire et social

- à la mise en œuvre de programmes nationaux de reconstruction et de développement de la République Centrafricaine, en mettant l'accent sur les infrastructures socio-économiques de base ;

à la libre circulation des ONG nationales et internationales et à la protection des humanitaires ;

au retour de tous les réfugiés et personnes déplacées et à l'identification de toute la population afin de le faciliter ;

à la mise en œuvre d'un début de travaux à haute intensité de main d'œuvre urgents, orientés vers les ex-combattants, les jeunes et la communauté, pour la réhabilitation des infrastructures prioritaires (routes, écoles, hôpitaux, etc.) ;

à la prise en charge alimentaire et aux soins pour les membres des groupes politico-militaires, ainsi que leurs familles, durant la période du DDR ;

à la distribution, après identification, de kits (outils agricoles, semences, bétail, matériel de construction ou autre) pour ceux qui choisissent de retourner à la vie civile ;

- à la mise à disposition des groupes politico-militaires des moyens nécessaires à la sensibilisation et à la vulgarisation du présent accord ;

- à l'organisation de cours de formation technique (électriciens, mécaniciens, charpentiers, etc.) et de bourses d'études pour ceux qui désirent initier une activité économique ;

pour ceux qui étaient déjà employés de l'État, une commission mixte gouvernement-groupes politico-militaires sera établie pour l'évaluation de chaque cas.

pour ceux qui désirent rejoindre la fonction publique ou reprendre des études, des mesures appropriées devront être mises en place par le gouvernement.

Sortie de crise

La feuille de route du présent accord sera établie par un comité de suivi conjoint pour la mise en œuvre de tous les points susmentionnés, dont les membres seront choisis par consensus, avec la participation de la Communauté de Sant'Egidio.

A la fin du processus du DDRR il n'y aura plus de groupes politico-militaires en République Centrafricaine mais seulement des forces politiques. Le Pays sera sécurisé par la MINUSCA et par ses propres forces de défense et de sécurité, présentes sur toute l'étendue du territoire national.

Nous remercions la communauté internationale pour son soutien à la République Centrafricaine, ainsi que sa présence à Rome avec des observateurs. Nous lui demandons de soutenir les mesures susmentionnées par les programmes déjà existants ou à définir.

Nous demandons aussi à l'Union Africaine, qui a incessamment œuvré pour la stabilisation de la République Centrafricaine, de nous soutenir à tous les niveaux dans la mise en application de cet accord et dans la pacification du Pays.


Nous remercions la Communauté de Sant'Egidio pour son soutien à la réconciliation nationale et nous lui demandons de poursuivre son travail de médiation, de dialogue et de suivi de l'exécution du présent Accord.

Pour le Gouvernement :

CHARLES ARMEL DOUBANE
Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République Centrafricaine




GEORGES-ISIDORE-ALPHONSE DIBERT
Conseiller politique du Président de la République Centrafricaine




Pour les groupes politico-militaires :


MOUSTAPHA ABAKAR - RPRC



BRAHIM ABDOULAYE - IPRC




BARTHELEMY BOGUYANAN - FDPIC




SOULEMANE DAOUDA - UPC




HERBERT GOTRAN DJONO-AHABA - RPRC




LAURENT DJIM-WOEI BEBITI - RJ BELANGA



DIEU BENIT CHRISTIAN GBEYA-KIKOBET - UFR-F



HABIB HODI - UPC




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
BIENVENU BERTRAND KOUNKOU - RJ SAYO




ASCAIN NZENGUE LANDA - UFR




LAMBERT LISSANE-MOUKOVE - FPRC




ANICET SIMPLICE MACKOUMOU - UFR




ARMEL MINGATO OUM-SAYO - RJ SAYO




ABDEL KARIM MOUSSA - MPC




THIERRY CYPRIEN M'PONDO - SELEKA RENOVEE



DIEUDONNE NDOMETE - Coordination ANTIBALAKA




JEAN DE DIEU NGAISSONA - ANTIBALAKA AILE MOKOM



LARRY FABRICE NORDINE-MINDOM-MAHALBA - MLJC




JUDICAELO OROFE MOGANAZOUM - Coordination ANTIBALAKA




SIMON PIERRE PASSI INGAM - RJ BELANGA




JEAN-ROCK SOBI - FDPC




DEYA GILBERT - TOUMOU - MLJC



GUY BONGARKA WABILO - ANTIBALAKA AILE MOKOM




BERNARD FRANCOIS WAGRAMALE - UFR



Pour la Communauté de Sant'Egidio

ANDREA RICCARDI
Fondateur de la Communauté de Sant'Egidio




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
PARFAIT ONANGA-ANYANGA
Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies
en Centrafrique et chef de la Minusca

MARIO GIRO
Vice-Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de l'Italie


TIMOLEON BAIKOUA
Vice-Président de l'Assemblée Nationale



BERTIN BEA
Secrétaire Général du KKK




ANKET DOLOGUELE
Président de l'URCA




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
FERDINAND ALEXANDRE NGUENDET
Président du RPR




MARTIN ZIGUELE
Président du MLPC



GODEFROY MOKAMANEDE
Représentant du Cardinal Nzapalainga



IBRAHIM HASSAN FREDE
Chargé de Communication de la Coordination des
Organisations Musulmanes de Centrafrique (COMUC)



Annex 2.5: Update on the Special Criminal Court (SCC).

On 9 June 2017, the Panel met with Mr. Toussaint Muntazini, the Special Prosecutor of the SCC, who was appointed on 14 February 2017. The Prosecutor indicated that, although the Deputy and Substitute Special Prosecutors as well as SCC judges had been appointed, the facilities of his office and that of the Special Court were not yet operational.

However, the Special Prosecutor indicated that he had started working on the strategy to be implemented by his office. One of the documents that would help him would be the Mapping Report documenting the serious violations committed within the country between 2003 and 2015, commissioned by the Security Council in 2016 and published in May 2017.³ This report includes many references to the Panel's reports.

³ http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CF/Mapping2003-2015/2017CAR_Mapping_Report_EN.pdf

Annex 3.1: Panel's briefing on the arms embargo for CAR national authorities (Bangui, 14 April 2017).

1) Discussions

On 14 April, the Panel organized a briefing on the arms embargo in Bangui. Representatives of all relevant Ministries and agencies participated, including representatives of the Presidency (see full list of participants below). The Panel also invited officials of MINUSCA and the EUTM. By presenting the provisions of resolution 2339 (2017) related to the arms embargo with a focus on notification and exemption procedures, the Panel aimed to facilitate a better understanding of the arms embargo regime and avoid misunderstanding and politicization of this issue.

During the meeting, participants had the opportunity to raise questions and make observations. The three main concerns expressed by the participants: (1) poor impact of the arms embargo on armed groups' capacity to acquire weaponry; (2) complexity and technical nature of the procedures regarding the submission of exemption requests and notifications; (3) difficulty to find States and private companies willing to donate or sell weapons to the CAR authorities.

2) List of participants.

Name	Title	Entity	Contact	Telephone
Col SELESSON	Conseiller DORA/DA	PRÉSIDENCE	mel.selesson@pcha.fr	75 28 79 78
GBO RUYA	Coord	EUTM	adm.ungetam.com	72 50 17 77
SCHERERON Nicolas	Chief of Mission Nigeria	TRANSIT	scheron@un.org	79 88 67 9
GBEYI David	Trésorier R. Intérieur	Ministère de l'Intérieur	daugy@pcha.fr	71 03 54 50
Alfred SERVICE	CHIEF	YAE	audrey@pcha.fr	72 50 67 6
Victor 'Acous	COO/DA	COA	Victor@pcha.fr	72 50 27 27
GDB Izamo Bruno	ISSA/ICAN	Ministère de la Santé	bruno.izamo@pcha.fr	75 50 45 50
Kelly R. Baker	MCS Country Officer Nigeria	Presidence de la République	kbaker@pcha.fr	71 50 20 27
Gol Mohamed Fadi	Coordinateur RSE/PR	Présidence de la République	fadi@pcha.fr	75 06 16 65
Ben VACANT-THOMY	DEPUTÉ	Assemblée Nat	ben.vacant@pcha.fr	72 77 77 58
Souren Vein	Coordinateur de PAI	Assemblée Nat	vein@pcha.fr	75 20 54 83
GB Houssem Jassem	CTD	Assemblée Nat	houssem@pcha.fr	75 40 71 85
Col. SAKPOUMOU Séverin Junior	Exercice	Assemblée Nat	severin@pcha.fr	75 03 12 59
Thérèse Gbana	Trésorier Général	Ministère de l'Intérieur	therese@pcha.fr	75 03 34 15
Thérèse Gbana	Administrateur Général	Ministère de l'Intérieur	therese@pcha.fr	75 03 34 15
Col. DOUGOLA Séverin	Chef de Mission	Gendarmerie	col.dougola@pcha.fr	75 03 80 24

3) Pictures.



Annex 3.2: Calls by the Government and Presidency calls for the rearmament of the national defence forces

Documents obtained by the Panel from EUTM, May and June 2017

Bangui, Le 10 Février 2017

Joseph NABETE
Ministre de la Défense Nationale
à
General Mehdi KOSTARAKIS
Chairman of the European Union Military Committee

SUBJECT: Armes de tir direct pour les unités FACA entrainées par EUTM
REFERENCE: Dialogue politique An 8 UE-RCA

L'EUTM RCA a obtenu l'entraînement opérationnel du troisième bataillon d'infanterie légère (BIT) des forces armées centrafricaines (FACA) en octobre 2016. La formation de la 1^{re} compagnie a été achevée, comme prévue, en décembre 2016.

Cette compagnie ne peut actuellement être déployée pour accomplir sa mission de défense du territoire et de la population en coordination avec la MINUSCA car elle ne dispose pas de l'armement nécessaire. Si cette compagnie n'est pas déployée, elle va perdre le bénéfice de sa formation.

Le problème se représentera à l'issue de l'entraînement des 2^{ème} et 3^{ème} compagnies prévu en mai à 2017 ainsi que pour toutes les unités futures formées par EUTM RCA.

Une estimation des besoins en armement a été effectuée suivant le planning des formations organisées par EUTM (Annexe A). Une livraison même partielle permettrait tous les équipements progressif au niveau des compagnies. Les propositions éventuelles seront systématiquement soumises au comité des sanctions.

C'est donc l'importance pour nos FACA de mettre en pratique la formation donnée par EUTM et le signal fort donné à la population de voir son armée au service d'un gouvernement démocratiquement élu nous vous serons très reconnaissants de bien vouloir étudier avec les États membres de l'Union européenne la possibilité de contribuer au réarmement de nos soldats.



*Le Président de la République
Chapitel Sarr*



Chapitel Sarr

Madame la Haute Représentante,

La mission européenne de formation EUTM RCA, lancée au mois de juillet 2015, achèvera ce mois d'Avril l'entraînement du premier bataillon des Forces Armées Centrafricaines (FACA), conformément à son mandat.

Or, à l'heure actuelle, les FACA ne disposent pas d'armement et ce bataillon ne peut donc être déployé pour accomplir sa mission de défense du territoire et de la population. Il ne peut non plus se maintenir en condition opérationnelle et risque de perdre le bénéfice de son entraînement. Ce problème se représentera à l'issue de l'entraînement des 2^{ème} et 3^{ème} bataillons en Novembre 2017 et en Avril 2018.


Mon gouvernement a adressé en Février une demande de contribution aux Etats Membres de l'Union Européenne via le Comité Militaire de l'UE, et d'autres démarches bilatérales ont été menées et ne sont, malheureusement, sans résultat.

Compte tenu de ces éléments, la RCA opte pour l'achat des armes nécessaires aux FACA formées par EUTM.

A cette fin, je sollicite l'appui de l'UE ou de l'un de ses Etats Membres pour apporter à mon gouvernement une assistance dans l'acquisition de ces armes, à la fois dans la mise en relation avec les sociétés d'armement, dans le respect de la procédure unilatérale du comité des sanctions des Nations Unies et dans la logistique de la livraison.

La restauration de l'autorité de l'Etat est critique aujourd'hui en RCA. Dans ce cadre, nos FACA ont un rôle essentiel à jouer. Pour que les efforts conjoints fournis par la RCA et l'UE en faveur de la réforme du secteur de la sécurité aboutissent et contribuent effectivement à la paix et au développement, je vous serais reconnaissant de l'aide que vous pourriez nous apporter dans le rearmement de nos FACA.

Je vous prie d'agréer, **Madame la Haute Représentante**, l'expression de ma haute considération.


Pr. Faustin Archange TOUADERA

Madame Frederica MOGHERINI
Haute Représentante de l'UE
Pour les Affaires Etrangères et la Politique de Sécurité

CC :
Comité militaire de l'UE

Annex 3.3: Response of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the CAR Government's call to procure military material

Document obtained from EUTM on 15 June 2017.



**BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
JOINT STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
CHIEF**

Sarajevo, April 10th, 2017

Dear General KOSTARAKOS,

On behalf of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on behalf of myself I express highest compliments to you general KOSTARAKOS and to all the members of the European Union Military Committee (EUMC).

I would like to thank you for accepting our offer for the participation of the members of Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the European Union Peace Support Mission. Currently we are completing envisaged legal procedures related to approval of justification by the executive and legislative authorities and we expect a positive attitude when it comes to preparation and participation of our members in Peace Support Mission in the near future.

I am convinced that as up to now, Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina together with other relevant institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, will be and remain a catalyst of positive processes when it comes to preparing and participation of BiH Armed Forces members within the Peace Support Missions and Peacekeeping Missions of the United Nations, NATO and the European Union.

I would like to inform you that your letter dated 16 March 2017 was carefully considered and in that respect Joint Staff AF BiH, within its functional competencies, analyzed and evaluated possible options for realization of aforementioned donation, and initiated the decision-making initiative on the donation of the requested resources in accordance with legal regulations respecting the UN Security Council Resolutions 2262 and 2339.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
JOINT STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
BULBINA 1, 71000 SARAJEVO
PHONE: +387 (0)31 26 00 11 FAX: +387 (0)31 26 00 01



BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BOSNIJSKO VJEŠTAČENJE OD BRANILAČKE
BULBINA 1, 71000 SARAJEVO
TEL: +387 (0)31 26 00 11 FAX: +387 (0)31 26 00 01



BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
JOINT STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
CHIEF

Continuing the process of raising the capacities and capabilities of the Security Forces of Central African Republic, we are also open to consider other options such as selling, since the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina approved selling as one of the ways of revolving surpluses of weapons and ammunition within the capacities of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Once again, on behalf of all the members of Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and on behalf of myself I express my highest compliments with sincere hope for continuation of successful and mutually beneficial cooperation in the future.

Very Respectfully,

Anto JELIĆ
Lieutenant General
Chief, JS AF BiH

EUROPEAN UNION MILITARY COMMITTEE
General Mikhail KOSTARAKIS
The Chairman


BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
JOINT STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES
GENERAL STAFF
PHONE: +387 (0)51 33-44-15, FAX: +387 (0)51 33-44-02



BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE
GENERAL STAFF
PHONE: +387 (0)51 33-44-15, FAX: +387 (0)51 33-44-02

On 15 June 2017, EUTM also informed the Panel of Experts regarding the proposal of Georgia to sell weaponry.

Annex 3.4: Maps on arms trafficking routes.



Annex 4.1: Reported travel of François Bozizé through Nairobi International Airport (18 November 2016).

Pictures available at

https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=596660683854132&id=100005306176367&pnref=story. Accessed on 2 July 2017.



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
Yékatom's payslips for February and April 2017. Obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 10 and 13 June 2017.

[illegible]

Annex 4.4: Abdoulaye Hissène and Ets Djiguira

Documents seized by the national gendarmerie at Hissène's house on 16 August 2016, and obtained by the Panel on 18 October 2016


Letter from Société Générale Tchad addressed to Abdoulaye Hissène as representative of the company Djiguira (5 October 2010).



Written check from the company Djiguira




Account number of Djiguira at United Bank of Africa (UBA).




Annex 4.5: Abdoulaye Hissène and the company Abi Tchad


Documents seized by the national gendarmerie at Hissène's house on 16 August 2016 and obtained by the Panel on 18 October 2016.

First page of one of the agreements between Abi Tchad and one European company



Letters between Abi Tchad and one European company regarding the selling of oil by the former to the latter.





Annex 4.6 Abdoulaye Hissène's attempt to sell gold allegedly stored in Nairobi.

Documents obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 7 May 2017.

Several sources told the Panel that the price indicated on the document below is much lower than the normal price on the market.⁴ The managing director of the Dubai-based company mentioned in the document (Axor Gold) told the Panel that this document was a forgery. He indicated that his company had never done any business with any company based in Kenya and that his company's invoices were very different.⁵



SOVEREIGN FREIGHTERS LTD
 Clearing and Forwarding & General Traders
 P.O. BOX 98453-00100 NAIROBI - KENYA
 Tel: +254 799 980953 Email: info@sovereignfreighters.com

Invoice

INVOICE No.	PLA08/87714
INVOICE DATE	27TH AUG 2014
INVOICE TO	AXOR GOLD P.O BOX 13500 GOLD SOUC DUBAI, U.A.E
DESCRIPTION	300 KGS OF GOLD BARS

DETAILS	AMOUNT (USD)
INSURANCE	120,000.00
ROYALTIES	400,000.00
CHANGE OF OWNERSHIP	5,800.00
AGENCY FEE	20,000.00
FREIGHT-NBO TO DXB	8,100.00
MINERAL EXPORT LICENCE	11,500.00
SMELTING FEE	30,000.00
STORAGE FEE (30 DAYS)	45,000.00
TOTAL (USD)	720,400.00


Total Amount in US Dollars say **SEVEN HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED ONLY**



⁴ Phone discussion with confidential sources, 7 May, 22 and 25 June 2017.


⁵ Phone discussions with M. Shahid Motiwala, 13 and 14 June 2017.

The document below shared by Abdoulaye Hissène with potential buyers mentions a quantity of gold of only 7 grams - way below the 300 kilos Hissène claimed that he owned



Annex 4.7: Abdoulaye Hissène and the company Sovereign Freighters LTD

Document seized by the national gendarmerie at Hissène's house on 16 August 2016, and obtained by the Panel on 18 October 2016




The first document in the previous annex also refers to Sovereign Freighters LTD. Phone numbers and email addresses indicated on the company's website (<http://sovereignfreighters.com/>) do not function. There is also no indication that this company has ever paid any taxes to the Kenyan State.⁶

⁶ Phone discussion with a confidential source, 22 June 2017


Annex 4.8. Abdoulaye Hissène's attempts to invest in Cameroon.

Abdoulaye Hissène has considered investing in a company based in Cameroon. Below is a copy of a procès-verbal dated 25 April 2014 indicating that Hissène would take over a fifth of the company's shares (CFA 125 million or \$US 200 000).



Document seized by the National gendarmerie at Hissène's house on 16 August 2016 and obtained by the Panel on 18 October 2016.

Below is a copy of a bank check dated 14 July 2014 of CFA 60 million (\$US 103 000) from Hissène to the same company.



Document seized by the national gendarmerie at Hissène's house on 16 August 2016 and obtained by the Panel on 18 October 2016.

The Director of the company told the Panel that this check was never cashed and that Hissène therefore never actually possessed any shares of the company.⁷ Hissène would have instructed the Director to wait for his green light before cashing the check. The green light was never given, as Hissène allegedly never received the payment from a third source which would have provided him with the liquidities to invest.


Records of both Hissène's and the company's bank accounts confirm that Hissène never actually sent any payments to the company.

Ecobank informed the Panel that the account associated with the check above was closed by the bank on 16 May 2016 due to prolonged inactivity.⁸

⁷ Meeting with the company's director, 23 May 2017.

[§] Email exchanges with the company's director, 23 May 2017, email exchanges with Ecobank officers, 23 June 2017

Annex 5.1: Map on fighting in the Bangassou area (March-June 2017)



Nzacko hosts an important mining site. On 23 March, the FPRC and anti-balaka fighters ousted UPC from the city. Mahamat Saleh was reportedly the zone commander of the area. In early June, anti-balaka groups attacked FPRC positions in Nzacko.

On 23 March, UPC was ousted from Bakouma by anti-balaka groups supported by FPRC. On 6 June, the FPRC led-coalition attacked anti-balaka in the town retaliating for anti-balaka actions in Nzacko during previous days.

Gambo is held by the UPC. It is a door to Béma and Satema which are important arms trafficking hubs.

On 8 May, a MINUSCA convoy was attacked by self-defence anti-balaka groups. 5 peacekeepers were killed.

On 13 May, Bangassou was attacked by anti-balaka groups coming from the Bangassou-Bakouma and the Bangassou-Rafai axes. The attackers targeted the Muslim community and the MINUSCA base.

Annex 5.2: Appointment of "general" Al-Khatim as FPRC's chief of staff (27 April 2017)

Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 2 May 2017

FRONT POPULAIRE POUR LA RENAISSANCE
DE CENTRAFRIQUE
BUREAU EXECUTIF NATIONAL
HAUT CONSEIL SUPREME
CONSEIL NATIONAL DE DEFENSE ET DE
SECURITE
N° FPRC/BNR/SC/ND/017



Republique Centrafricaine
Union - Dignité - Travail

DECISION N°_001_

**Portant Nomination des Officiers Supérieurs de la Coalition du Conseil
National de Défense et de Sécurité à des Postes de Responsabilité**

Le 1^{er} Vice Président

- Vu** les Décisions de l'Assemblée Générale de Juillet 2014 tenue à Birao, Portant création et la mise en place des structures du FPRC ;
- Vu** les Décisions de l'Assemblée Générale du 02 Novembre 2014 tenue à Kaga Bandoro, portant mise en place de la chaine de Commandement Militaire du FPRC et ses modificatifs subséquents ;
- Vu** les Décisions de l'Assemblée Générale des 18 et 19 Octobre 2016 tenue à Bria, portant création et mise en place du Conseil National de Défense et Sécurité (CND5) ;
- Vu** le Procès-Verbal des Consultations des 26 et 27 Avril 2017 tenu à Ndélé ;

Sur Proposition du Conseil National de Défense et de Sécurité (CND5) :

DECIDE

Article 1^{er} : Les Officiers Supérieurs dont les suivants, sont nommés à des postes de Responsabilité suivants:

- 1-Chef d'Etat Major Général : Général des Armées **Mohamat AL KHATIM**
- 2-Le 1^{er} Chef d'Etat Major Adjoint : Général **Asor KHALIT**
- 2-Le 2^o Chef d'Etat Major Adjoint : Général **Sallet ZABADHI**

Article 1^{er} : La présente décision qui prend effet à compter de la date de sa signature, sera communiquée partout où besoin sera./.

Fait à Ndélé le 27 Avril 2017

Le Vice Président

(Signature)

Gi Nourredine ADAM



Annex 5.3: Communiqué of Bangui-based MPC leaders excluding Mahamat Al-Khatum and Idnss El-Bachar from the group. Document obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 22 January 2017.



Bangui le 06.01.2017

DECLARATION A LA PRESSE

Dans la déclaration du MPC, suite au lendemain des violences des 11 et 12 octobre 2016 à Kagabandoro, nous avons regretté les multiples vies innocentes qui ont été fauchées sans raison et avons demandé qu'une enquête soit menée pour établir les responsabilités.

Selon les informations recueillies auprès des populations, des élus locaux, des autorités locales, des combattants MPC de Kagabandoro ainsi que les rapports documentés de la MINUSCA publiés le 2 novembre 2016, il est apparu l'implication indéniable du Général Al Khatim, chef d'Etat-Major du MPC basé à Kaba.

Le Président du MPC, en poste à Kagabandoro, cité également par toutes les personnes consultées ou qui ont accepté de descendre à Bangui pour nous confier leurs soucis, Idnss ELBACHAR, n'a pas été à la hauteur des espoirs placés en lui, parce que ses expériences et sa croyance n'ont pas été mises à la disposition du MPC pour lui éviter la situation de crise dans laquelle elle est plongée actuellement.

Faudrait-il rappeler les déclarations qui ont fondé le MPC, à l'issue des Etats Généraux du 27 au 30 Juillet 2015 à Kagabandoro ? Nous rappelons :

Les membres du Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique s'engagent solennellement pour la protection des populations, des ONG nationales et internationales.

Désormais les violences contre les personnes, les actes de pillages, les vols et les viols seront sévèrement réprimés.

Les Etats Généraux ont aussi recommandé d'intensifier la collaboration avec les autorités locales pour la restauration de l'autorité de l'Etat et ils mettront tout en œuvre pour assurer la libre circulation des personnes et particulièrement le bon déroulement de tout le processus électoral.

Actuellement, Monsieur Idnss ALBACHAR continue ses menées fraktionnistes qui risquent de compromettre définitivement les orientations de départ qui sont pour le rétablissement d'une paix durable en Centrafrique.


Le Bureau Politique du MPC, après une longue consultation et des discussions enrichissantes avec les commandants de zones et les Généraux, qui encadrent sur le terrain, les éléments résolument engagés dans le processus du DDRRR/RSS, condamne fermement le comportement anti organisationnel d'Al Khatim et d'Idriss ALBACHAR et les exclue de ses rangs.

Toutes les positions qu'ils ont prises n'engagent qu'eux seuls et ne concernent en rien le Mouvement Patriotique pour la Centrafrique (MPC).

Nous en appelons à l'opinion publique centrafricaine, au Gouvernement, à la Communauté Internationale et à tous les partenaires de la République Centrafricaine à intensifier leurs aides au peuple centrafricain pour qu'il recouvre sa souveraineté et sa cohésion.


Ont signé

Le Secrétaire Général




Abel BALENGUELE

**Le Coordonnateur Général
Chargé du DDRR/RSS
Commandant en Chef
Des camps Béal/BSS**



Le Général ABDEL KARIM MOUSSA

**Le Coordonnateur Général Adjoint
Chargé du DDRRR/RSS
de la sensibilisation et de la**



Ghislain BRIA

Annex 5.4: FPRC and MPC military materiel

Photographs received by the Panel from confidential source, 21 January 2017.



Photographs published on Facebook on 20 January 2017, available at <https://www.facebook.com/PatrioteKalma/posts/1247031938676931/?pnref=story>



Annex 5.5: Sanctioned individuals Haroun Gaye, Abdoulaye Hissène and Nourredine Adam's involvement in arms-trafficking operations at the Chadian border.

The border town of Tissi, already mentioned in the Panel's 2016 final report as a location from where sanctioned individual Nourredine Adam recruits and procures arms (S/2016/694, para 176), has become the principal arms-trafficking hub for the FPRC. In spite of the presence of the Tripartite forces in the area, the FPRC remains in full control of this strategically located town on the Chadian border and close to Sudan. Since his departure from Bangui, sanctioned individual Haroun Gaye is based in Tissi from where he oversees the trafficking activities. Gaye's combatants are well equipped with AK-type assault rifles, RPGs and machine guns and wear new military uniforms.¹ On 11 January 2017, Gaye threatened to kill a Burundian military observer and commanded his men to surround a MINUSCA patrol that had to leave in haste, fearing hostilities.² Adam, who continues to play a central role in FPRC recruitment and procurement of arms (S/2016/694, para. 176), spent one week in Tissi late February 2017 to mobilize troops, materiel and negotiate a solution with the Rezegat tribe. He returned to the border-town late March.³

The dry season allowed the passage of vehicles coming from Um Dukhun (Sudan)⁴ that cross into Chad to go via Tissi to Siki Kede and Nda in the west of Vakaga prefecture.⁵ Mahamat Djouma, General Damane, Nourredine Adam and sanctioned individual Abdoulaye Hissène own vehicles and trucks that circulate freely in the zone and cross the border with Sudan and Chad to resupply.⁶ On 25 June, Djouma arrived in Birao coming from Bria, and he left to Sudan again on 29 June. Since 25 June, many pistols circulate in Birao town.⁷

According to witnesses, Hissène erected a big tent in Ndele, alleging it has been used as a dorm for combatants in transit and as temporary depot for the weaponry (pictures below).⁸ In early February, Hissène and Gaye once more entered Ndele with a shipment of weapons and supplies.⁹ MINUSCA also observed a strong military presence in Siki Kede, where the FPRC reportedly stores some of its weapons.¹⁰ FPRC leaders confirmed that in mid-January and early June, Hissène entered Bria with a significant amount of military materiel.¹¹

¹ Confidential report, 11 January 2017.

² Ibid.

³ Confidential meeting, Bangui, 12 April 2017; Confidential report, 1 March 2017.

⁴ Um Dukhun is a border town between Chad and Sudan.

⁵ Meeting with Prefet, militia and civil society, Birao and Am Dafock, 24 to 26 January 2017.

⁶ Confidential meeting, Bangui, 9 April 2017; Confidential documents, 1 and 2 March 2017 and 7 April 2017; Confidential call, Brindisi, 29 July.

⁷ Confidential call, Brindisi, 29 July.


⁸ Panel's mission to Ndele, 17 January 2017.

⁹ Confidential report, 3 February 2017.

¹⁰ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 8 April 2017.

¹¹ Meeting with civil society leader Yaya Idriss, Bria, 23 January 2017; Meeting with General Ibrahim (FPRC), Bria, 24 January 2017; Confidential report, 1 June 2017.

Tent located at Abdoulaye Hissène's property in Ndélé. Photographs obtained by the Panel on 26 January 2017 from a confidential source



Annex 5.6: Arms-trafficking operations at the border with Sudan and South Sudan

In early 2017, commercial traffic and potential arms smuggling through the main border crossing at Am Dafok, bordering Sudan, decreased because of tightened border controls by the Sudanese authorities and the inaccessibility of the town of Bambari, the main destination for Sudanese traders.¹² From March onwards, it seems that trafficking has resumed. Sudanese herders also use cross-border cattle roads north of Am Dafok to smuggle arms and ammunition (see also S/2016/694, paras. 73-74).

Nourredine Adam was in Am Dafok and Burao on late February and late March, to sensitize local leaders and to put the local FPRC leaders on standby to send human and military reinforcement to attack Bambari if needed.¹³ Thereafter, together with General Damane Haroun Gaye and other FPRC leaders, Adam reportedly moved from Burao to Turupoulou to mobilize troops, and finally to Siki Kede and Nda (180 m south-west of Burao), in the west of the Vakaga prefecture, where the FPRC leadership maintains its base.¹⁴

The Panel was informed that on 25 April, vehicles from South Sudan had delivered arms and ammunition to Insa Bachir in Ndele. The cargo was composed of shells, rockets and launchers, AK-type assault rifles with ammunition, 11x12.7 mm machine guns and ammunition, 15 DKM and ammunition, 2 anti-aircraft missile boxes alongside military combat uniforms.¹⁵ A source informed the Panel that the delivery also included anti-aircraft missiles – reportedly to shoot down MINUSCA aircraft or helicopters.¹⁶

FPRC's acquisition of anti-aircraft missiles prior to 25 April has also been confirmed by other sources.¹⁷ On 6 June, FPRC fired one 60 mm mortar bomb near the road between Ouanda Djalle and Sam Ouandja.¹⁸

The tri-border area of the Central African Republic, South Sudan and DRC is increasingly unstable, as the ongoing conflict between the UPC and the FPRC-led coalition brought armed elements into the area and fueled an increasing flow of foreign fighters (see section on new foreign fighters from Chad and Sudan), together with arms and ammunition.¹⁹ According to UPC Hassan Bouba, at Nourredine Adam's request, Revad Mashar has recruited South Sudanese fighters to strengthen FPRC ranks.²⁰ Several sources also indicate that the armed groups recruit fighters in the DRC. To date, the Panel has not been in the position to verify this allegation.

¹² Mission to Bango and Am Dafok, 24 to 26 January 2017.

¹³ Confidential meeting, Bangui, 12 April. Confidential report, 1 March 2017.

¹⁴ During a mission to Siki Kede and Nda, early April, MINUSCA observed a strong military presence in the area. Confidential meeting, Bangui, 12 and 25 April 2017.

¹⁵ Communication with confidential source, 26 April 2017.

¹⁶ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 7 April 2017.

¹⁷ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 7 April 2017.

¹⁸ Confidential document, 6 June 2017.

¹⁹ Confidential document, 3 April 2017.

²⁰ Meeting with Hassan Bouba, Bambari, 11 April.

Annex 5.7: Foreign fighters from Chad and Sudan

Independent sources have reported regular incursions of men in military uniforms, observed even in places where MINUSCA has presence, such as Ndélé, Bangui, Mbré, Bria, Yalinga, Ouadja and Kaga Bandoro.²¹ On 22 May, 100 armed elements, reportedly from Chad, were observed in Betsoudja village, 62 km north of Paoua.²²

In early March, 20 Sudanese fighters armed with non-conventional weapons and travelling on motorcycles and vehicles were reportedly seen in Bangui.²³ In November 2016 and mid-March 2017, respectively, 70 and 18 armed men were observed on the Bangui-Ndélé axis. The Panel's source identified them as being Chadian and entering the CAR territory to strengthen the FPRC-led coalition.²⁴

In Kaga Bandoro, the Panel observed men wearing uniforms in the neighbourhood of Al Khatun's base and at an ex-Selka checkpoint in the Christian neighbourhood.²⁵ Independent sources informed the Panel that Chadians enter the town via the Ouadja-Kaga Bandoro axis.²⁶

²¹ Confidential documents, 20 February 2017 and 10 March 2017; Mission to Kaga Bandoro, 7 April 2017; Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 12 April 2017.

²² Confidential document, 24 May 2017.

²³ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 12 April 2017.


²⁴ Meeting with confidential source, Bangui, 12 April 2017.

²⁵ Mission to Kaga Bandoro, 7 April 2017.

²⁶ Mission to Kaga Bandoro, 7 April 2017.

Annex 5.8: Chadian passports, weapons and photographs reportedly found on bodies of killed FPRC fighters.

Photographs given to the Panel by the UPC in Bambari on 20 January 2017



Annex 5.9: Recruitment of Sudanese nationals by Moussa Assimeh

According to General Zacharia Damane, Moussa Assimeh, one of the most important Seleka generals in 2013 and a Sudanese national (S/2016/1032, par. 15), has been recruiting and introducing Sudanese armed fighters and weaponry into the CAR to strengthen the FPRC ranks.²⁷ This information was confirmed by intelligence services, diplomatic sources and members of armed groups.²⁸ Assimeh uses the road between Tuhu, a Sudanese border village 120 km south of Am Dafok (S/2016/694, par. 74), and Ouanda Djalle (Vakaga prefecture), from where he continues to the central regions of the CAR. In early January, Assimeh reportedly introduced 60 armed fighters in support of the FPRC-led coalition's planned attack against Ali Darassa's town of Bambari.²⁹

²⁷ Meeting with General Zacharia Damane, Burao, 24 January 2017.

²⁸ Meeting with confidential intelligence and diplomatic sources, Bangui, 28 January, 19 May and 16 June 2017. Meeting with confidential source, Bangui 13 June 2017. Meeting with confidential source, Bambari, 11 April 2017.

²⁹ Ibid.

Annex 5.10: FPRC's efforts to establish a parallel administration in the Ndélé area.

The prefecture of Bamangui-Bangora (see map below) is one of FPRC's main strongholds. The establishment of a parallel administration in this province was described in the Panel's report of 21 December 2015 (S/2015/936, paras 158-162). More precisely, Ndélé is the main area of influence of Abdoulaye Hissène, who is from Akoursoulbak (70 km north of Ndélé). Nourredine is from the Nda – Siki kede area, further north and west of the Vakaga prefecture.

During its latest visits to the area (17-19 January 2017 and 11-13 April 2017), the Panel noticed that, since his return to Ndélé in September 2016, Abdoulaye Hissène has consolidated FPRC's parallel administration in the Bamangui-Bangora to tax all types of economic activities.

The Panel witnessed the presence of a taxation office ("Bureau des impôts"), headed by a FPRC member (alias "Double Chaîne"). The office is located in the center of Ndélé next to the former police station which FPRC transformed into an illegal centre of detention. The office collects taxes from transhumance activities (see documentation below). Mobile FPRC units are positioned along the main transhumance routes, in particular around Ngolongosso and Ngarba (see map below), collecting up to 120,000 Francs CFA (200 USD) per herd.³⁰ Sporadic cattle theft constitute another source of revenue. Illegal checkpoints are also established around Ndélé, in particular along the Ndélé-Akoursoulbak axis to tax traders coming from Sudan.³¹


Various sources informed the Panel that the taxation of miners and collectors, as well as control of mining sites by FPRC, documented in the Panel's report of December 2015 (S/2015/936, paras 168-169), were also continuing.³² FPRC reportedly issues an annual "permit fee" of 25,000 CFA (40 USD) for collectors and 35,000 CFA (58 USD) for artisanal miners. Mining brigades are maintained to enforce this illegal taxation system.

³⁰ Meeting with Imssel Chuma Ibrahim, representative of Chadian nationals, Ndélé, 13 April 2017.

³¹ Along the Ndélé – Miamari axis, the Panel did not witness any checkpoints in April 2017, contrary to what had been observed in September 2015.

³² MINUSCA confidential report, 15 March 2017. Email communication with a confidential source, 28 April 2017.

Map of the prefecture of Bangui-Bangor in



Receipt of tax payment delivered to herders by FPRC.
Document shared with the Panel by email from a confidential source on 27 April 2017.



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Annex 5.11: Fighting on and around mining sites: the case of Agoudou Manga Ouadja Ouadja Yassin

The mining site « Yassin », located on the Bambari-Ippy axis was a significant source of income for UPC, where around 100 people allegedly worked until the 20 March fighting.³³ As of that date, several waves of clashes took place in the area.

While UPC had left Agoudou Manga Ouadja Ouadja Yassin, probably for troop rotation purposes, anti-balaka elements entered the villages, executed 4 persons in Agoudou Manga, and regrouped everyone in Yassin, via Ouadja Ouadja. The anti-balaka elements were identified as being elements of Jonathan and Risqueux. Clashes ensued when UPC elements returned to the area.

According to the chief nurse of Agoudou Manga, 45 people - mainly civilians including men, women and children - got killed in Yassin.³⁴ Another 10 persons, both Christians and Muslims, got killed in Ouadja Ouadja.³⁵ When the Panel visited Agoudou Manga, witnesses told that corpses in Ouadja Ouadja and Yassin, both entirely abandoned by the villagers, had not been recovered out of fear of being attacked by anti-balaka elements still around in the area.³⁶

³³ Meeting with confidential sources, Bangui, 8 and 9 April 2017.

³⁴ Meeting with the chief nurse, Agoudou Manga, 10 April 2017. The anti-balaka elements were identified as being elements of Jonathan and Risqueux.

³⁵ Ibid. Wounded civilians had been evacuated to Bambari.

³⁶ Panel's mission to Agoudou Manga, 10 April 2017.

Annex 5.12: UPC attacks, January – June 2017

Reported attacks as of June 2017. Information collected by the Panel (Panel's database).

Date	Level 1 - Site/Village	Level 2 - Sub- Prefecture	Level 3 - Prefecture	Summary
02 01 17	Bambari	Bambari	Ouaka	UPC elements allegedly mistreated a 21-year-old IDP woman.
05 01 17	Bambari	Bambari	Ouaka	A woman from Beta 2 neighborhood informed that her nine-year-old daughter had been physically assaulted by a UPC element.
06 01 17	Bambari	Bambari	Ouaka	Illegal detention of one woman in the UPC illegal detention facility. Reportedly, the woman failed to pay a debt of FCFA 1 million. The victim's husband disclosed that FCFA 600,000 was already paid since his wife's incarceration.
09 01 17	Bambari	Bambari	Ouaka	Visit to the illegal UPC Police Commissariat in Bambari where the armed group has detained three individuals: a 35-year-old business woman who has been detained for selling stolen goods and a 16-year-old boy and 25-year-old man on theft charges. The 16-year-old boy reported that he suffered beatings at the hands of other detainees.
09 01 17	Bria-Bangassou- Bakouma	Bangassou	Mbomou	Confidential sources reported that the UPC may be strengthening its positions in majority Fulani localities including Bema, Bakouma, Gambo, Nzako, and Pombolo. There are also non-confirmed reports of a possible 7 January FPRC attack on the UPC base in Nzako.
17 01 17	Mbroutchou	Bria	Haute Kotto	Reported clashes taken place in the early morning in Mbroutchou, 27km Est of Ippy, on Ippy-Bria axis, between the coalition (FPRC/MPC) and UPC. Information confirms that the FPRC coalition forces have been repelled 12km from Mbroutchou in direction to Bria. Five fighters from UPC were injured and transported to Bambari hospital by the Red Cross. UPC controls Ippy and the axis leading to the town. UPC elements are concealed along the axis ahead of Ippy and a few of them were spotted 10 km from Ippy in this area in direction of Bria.

23 01 17	Bakouma Nzako	Nzako	Mbomou	Reported presence of foreign fighters within UPC in Bakouma and area around Nzako. Reportedly, armed elements arrived in Bakouma on 05 January and left on 15 January to Nzako and other destinations beyond the mining town. According to local population and authorities in Bakouma, 25 of these elements, who spoke no French or Sango, stayed at UPC base in Bakouma. During that time, other armed elements (exact number not known) dressed in military attire were in possession of two horses and three camels. Local population and leaders suspected that they could be from Sudan. Two of these elements, aged around 14 years old, remained with UPC in Bakouma. In Nzako, local population said that during the period when a group of armed men arrived in Nzako, about 80 others were on transhumance routes around Nzako, allegedly committing abuses against civilians, including sexual violence.
31 01 17	Bambari	Bambari	Ouaka	Reported arbitrary deprivation of liberty of his 43-year-old brother by UPC elements, after the victim was accused of being an anti-balaka.
31 01 17	Ngakobo IDP camp	Bambari	Ouaka	Reported anti-balaka elements, under the command of Meya Jean Constant, reportedly killed and burned the son of a Fulani leader in the Ngakobo IDP camp. The son was originally abducted on 29 January. In retaliation, UPC allegedly abducted two civilians and reportedly killed one of them. Following the incidents, UPC clashed with anti-balaka elements in sugar fields belonging to the SUCAF company, resulting in the death of Jean Doungoupou, anti-balaka zone commander in Ngakobo, as well as two injured anti-balaka and one injured UPC element.
04 02 17	Kpokpo	Bria	Haute Kotto	A 26-year-old woman claimed that armed UPC elements attacked the village and raped her on 4 February. The victim also stated that at least 20 other women were raped during the attack.
04 02 17	Kpokpo	Bria	Haute Kotto	Reported UPC elements attacked and torched several houses and killed 12 civilians on 4 February. The population of Kpokpo village reportedly fled to Awalawa village (75 km east of Bria).
16 02 17	Bambari	Bambari	Ouaka	UPC elements reportedly detained seven persons from a predominantly Arab neighborhood and took them to the illegal UPC detention centre of Elevage. Later on the same day, all seven detainees were released upon paying a ransom of up to FCFA 30,000.

23 02 17	Baidou River	Bambari	Ouaka	40-50 UPC elements heading south towards Bambari crossed the Baidou River by ferry (30 km south of Ndassima), Ouaka prefecture. Additionally, unconfirmed reports indicate that UPC leader Ali Darassa is moving south of Bambari.
01 03 17	Kpokpo	Bria	Haute Kotto	UPC elements reportedly attacked and killed one man at the mining site.
02 03 17	Ndassima	Bambari	Ouaka	UPC elements abducted two civilian men from the Rounga ethnic group in early January 2017 in Ndassima (45 km north of Bambari). According to the witness, who is a brother of the alleged victims, eight UPC elements with an intention to kill ethnic Rounga intercepted and interrogated his two brothers on their way to Ndassima. His brothers have not been seen since.
03 03 17	Zemio-Rafai axis	Rafai	Mbomou	Three individuals from the Fulani community were reported to be abducted by suspected UPC elements. According to a prominent local Fulani leader, the abductors are claiming a ransom of 2,000,000 CFA francs for their release.
05 03 17	Bria	Bria	Haute Kotto	35 IDPs, mostly women and children, from Atongo-Bakari village (66 km south east of Ippy), Ouaka prefecture, arrived at the IDP camp in Bria. The IDPs fled their village after alleged UPC elements attacked them, resulting in 30 civilians killed and several houses burned.
06 03 17	Kombele	Bambari	Ouaka	Alleged presence of UPC elements in Kombele (10 km north east of Bambari), prompted villagers to flee to Bambari and surrounding villages. UPC elements have reportedly occupied the local school and confiscated personal property.
07 03 17	Bambari	Bambari	Ouaka	Alleged return to Bambari of certain high-profile members of the UPC political bureau, including Souleymane Daouda.
07 03 17	Maloum	Bria	Haute Kotto	Reported UPC armed elements stole 200 cows belonging to a trader of Chad origin called Moussa Djibril residing in Maloum. The UPC elements took the cows to Kamoumakia at 18 km from the crossroads at the crossing Maloum-Bambari.
07 03 17	Goubali 2	Bambari	Ouaka	Reported UPC elements attacked Goubali killing seven persons and looting and burning down several houses. The villagers fled to a neighbouring village.

07 03 17	Bambari	Bambari	Ouaka	On 07 March 2017, reported UPC elements killed two men in Tagbara, about 70 km from Bambari along the Bambari-Ippy axis. According to the allegations, the men had simply been killed because of their Arabic roots, as they had been suspected of serving as spies for the FPRC coalition. The victims had allegedly gone to a nearby bush in search of their cattle that had gone astray a few kilometers from Tagbara when the incident happened. Their bodies were reportedly found by relatives in Tagbara area who proceeded with funerary rites.
10 03 17	Grao	Bria	Haute Kotto	On 10 March 2017, in Grao (51 km east of Bria), Haute-Kotto prefecture, the village Chief informed MINUSCA that armed UPC elements clashed with a local self-defence group. Four UPC elements were allegedly killed and two civilians injured. The villagers fled towards Bria in fear of reprisals.
12 03 17	Ippy	Bambari	Ouaka	Reported killing of a man and a woman at 11 km west of Ippy (83 km west of Bambari), the two surviving children indicated that UPC elements killed their parents.
13 03 17	Atongo-Bakari	Bria	Ouaka	A 41-year-old reported that UPC elements attacked and killed nine civilians and injured him and two others in Atongo-Bakari (70 km south east of Ippy) on 13 March. He also indicated that Atongo-Bakari is deserted and the anti-Balaka controls the village.
14 03 17	Ippy-Tagbara axis	Bria	Ouaka	Villagers reported that along the Ippy-Tagbara axis, UPC attacked several villages at an unspecified date.
15 03 17	Bambari	Bambari	Ouaka	UPC Kouango zone commander reportedly abducted a UPC element attempting to defect. The element was allegedly tortured and severely wounded, according to his parents.
15 03 17	Bambari	Bambari	Ouaka	Reported UPC elements killed a 28-year-old Christian man in the Kadjigra neighborhood.
18 03 17	Ippy	Bria	Ouaka	On 18 March 2017 in Ippy, Ouaka prefecture, local authorities informed MINUSCA that suspected elements affiliated with UPC killed two civilians in Randiwa village (16 km south west of Ippy) and 10 others in Ambaka (37 km south west of Ippy). The population of Ambaka reportedly fled into the bush.
19 03 17	Bria	Bria	Haute Kotto	Three men reported that ex-Seleka UPC elements ill-treated them at Gobolo neighborhood. UPC elements accused them of being anti-balaka and spying on them. At the base, they were beaten with whips and metal wires.

20 03 17	PK5	Bangu	Bangu	A man reported that 35 UPC elements armed with AK47, grenades and knives caught a 23-year-old man, tied his hands and feet and beat him with gun butts where he sustained injuries on his back. The man was taken to their base at PK3 in Bambari.
21 03 17	Yassine mining site	Bambari	Ouaka	A woman who reported that ex-Seleka UPC elements killed her three children – a 14-year-old boy, a 12-year-old girl and eight month old boy during the attack on Yassine mining site on 21 March.
21 03 17	Bambari	Bambari	Ouaka	A man reported that UPC elements allegedly strangled a 60-old-year man of Arab ethnicity and stole his cattle.
22 03 17	Site Chinois axis	Bria	Haute Kotto	A man reported that one person was killed by ex-Seleka UPC elements at his farmland on Site Chinois axis.
23 03 17	Atongo-Bakari	Bambari	Ouaka	UPC elements reportedly attacked the market and torched a house where civilians sought refuge, including women and children. These elements also reportedly burned down several other houses in surrounding villages.
23 03 17	Gambo	Bangassou	Mbomou	UPC elements reportedly occupied Gambo primary school.
24 03 17	Bakouma	Nzako	Mbomou	A man reported that UPC elements robbed and killed a man in an area near Bana Bongo village located approximately 50 km north east of Bangassou on Zote axis, which is 25 kilometers north of Bangassou, in Bakouma sub prefecture.
31 03 17	Zote	Bangassou	Mbomou	Chief of Zote village reported that UPC members attacked and looted the village, they also allegedly raped a 15-year-old girl.
03 04 17	Bangassou-Issa Barh	Obo	Haut-Mbomou	UPC elements reportedly fired shots in the air and proceeded to loot the village once the local population fled.
04 04 17	Goulou	Nzako	Mbomou	UPC elements reportedly attacked the village of Goulou where three persons were found dead.
08 04 17	Bambari	Bambari	Ouaka	Reported clash between the FPRC coalition and UPC elements in Boyo resulted in seven FPRC elements wounded.

10/04/17	Rebondji	Bambari	Ouaka	UPC elements reportedly attacked the Rebondji village, where they raped a 12-year-old girl and wounded four other civilians, including the village chief.
11/04/17	Leungougba	Bangassou	Mbomou	UPC elements returned to Ngaba, and were allegedly committing criminal acts, causing some of the local population to flee.
14/04/17	Zembo	Zembo	Haut-Mbomou	On 14 April at around 9 pm UPC elements opened fire on MORBATT at their camp. On 15 April at approximately 0000 hours, another six UPC elements fired on the MORBATT camp. MORBATT returned fire, killing two elements and detaining two others. One was reportedly a Chadian national. No casualties or damage to the Force was reported. One civilian was slightly injured and transferred to the local hospital. MORBATT seized one AK47 with 12 cartridges and a mobile phone containing photos of the elements wearing military attire and a video demonstration on how to attack a convoy.
27/04/17	Obo	Obo	Haut-Mbomou	Presumed UPC elements allegedly abducted five civilians including a supervisor from an NGO, who were later found dead at 11 km east from Rafai.
28/04/17	Fode	Bangassou	Mbomou	UPC elements reportedly attacked Fode village.
02/05/17	Ippy-Bambari axis	Bambari	Ouaka	UPC elements reportedly clashed with FPRC.
03/05/17	Maïoun	Bambari	Ouaka	UPC leader Ali Darassa reportedly departed for Bokelobo (40 km south east of Bambari). Local sources claimed that Darassa intends to commence military operations in the Ndassouma and Ippy areas to clear out FPRC coalition elements.
09/05/17	Alindao	Alindao	Basse Kotto	Anti-balaka and UPC elements reportedly clashed in Balikougo neighbourhood, resulting in the reported death of 11 combatants. Some residents took shelter in the Catholic Mission, others fled into the bush and neighbouring villages.
12/05/17	Alindao	Alindao	Basse Kotto	Clashes between Anti-balaka and UPC elements in Alindao resulted in 8,500 IDPs at the Catholic mission. Community leaders claim that a high number of civilians have been killed.
20/05/17	Trognode	Bambari	Ouaka	UPC elements attacked Trognode (90 km north east of Bambari), Ouaka prefecture, and burned down all the houses.

24 05 17	Koutchio	Bambari	Ouaka	UPC elements attacked Koutchio village (67 km east of Bambari), Ouaka prefecture, which allegedly resulted in the killing of two civilians and the torching of several houses. Allegedly at least 12 other villages along the Tagbara – Boyo axis (between 85 km and 135 km north east of Bambari) were reportedly abandoned by the local population due to fears of further attacks.
08 06 17	Alindao	Alindao	Basse Kotto	Clashes between Anti-balaka and UPC elements in Alindao triggered the local population to flee to Kongbo village (50 km south of Alindao).
14 06 17	Mazambe, Ndjamamjago	Mobaye	Basse Kotto	UPC elements reportedly attacked and looted Mazambe and Ndjamamjago villages (21 km and 9 km north of Mobaye, Basse-Kotto prefecture).
14 06 17	Bambari	Bambari	Ouaka	UPC elements reportedly detained and killed the Mayor of Nzeleté and looted his house.

Annex 5.13: Arms traffic between Yakoma (DRC) and Béma, CAR

On 19 January 2017, the Panel was informed about an important shipment by boat from Yakoma (DRC) to Béma (CAR) of 18 boxes each containing 1,000 rounds of ammunition for AK-type assault rifles, 120 RPGs and other non-specified ammunition for conventional weapons. The value of this material was estimated at 4,500,000 FCFA. The shipment was supposed to arrive in Béma between 20 and 22 January. From there, the materiel was meant to be transported to Bambari via transhumance corridors crossing Alindao.¹⁷

¹⁷ Confidential report, 19 January 2016.

Annex 5.14: Ammunition clips and ammunition seized in Rafai on 8 December 2016

The traffickers declared that the weaponry was coming from Mboki, Haut Mbomou prefecture, and was to reach Bambari, Ouaka prefecture, to strengthen the troops of Ali Darassa's UPC.³⁸ Two of the traffickers were of Sudanese nationality.³⁹ Weapons coming from Sudan are smuggled into the CAR either through South Sudan or through roads between the Sudanese border and Nzako.⁴⁰

The Panel could not inspect the ammunition, as it was used by MINUSCA to defend its base in Bangassou during the 12 and 13 May 2017 attack.⁴¹

Photograph obtained by the Panel from MINUSCA in Bria on 23 January 2017.



³⁸ Confidential report, 9 December 2016.


³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Confidential reports, 19 January 2017 and 27 January 2017. Meeting with confidential intelligence and diplomatic sources, Bangui, 28 January 2017.

⁴¹ Panel mission to Bangassou, 8-13 June 2017.


Annex 5.15: UPC military materiel

Photographs and video snapshots of UPC armed elements and military materiel in Ndassuma and Bambari received from confidential source, January 2017.




Annex 5.16: Chadian ID cards and personal possessions reportedly found on bodies of killed UPC fighters.

Photographs given to the Panel by the FPRC in Bria, 23 January 2017.



Annex 5.17: LRA attacks against civilians.



Figures from "Invisible Children's LRA Crisis Tracker" and the panel's database of incidents. Figures are based on secondary sources which the Panel is not in a position to verify.

Annex 6.1: Identified arms-trafficking hubs for arms supplies from DRC and ROC to the CAR.



Annex 6.2: November 2016 meeting in Bangui to support anti-balaka operations.

On 5 November 2016, there was a closed meeting in Bangui's 8^e district to discuss arms supplies and recruitment in support of anti-balaka operations in the country, especially the Ouaka prefecture. The four individuals supporting the anti-balaka action present in the November meeting were Mazet Jackson (former Minister during the regime of Patassé and current vice-president of the *Mouvement de libération du peuple centrafricain* led by Martin Ziguélé), Sal Kharim Cedar (deputy of Grimar), Auben Amasita (deputy of Bambari 2) and Dokela Pagonidji (former Minister during the regime of Bozizé).

Séraphin Koméya and Hans Nemandji III, involved in the creation of the MRDP, did also attend the meeting. In October 2016, Séraphin Koméya and Hans Nemandji III, were both dismissed from the group by the MRDP Coordinator (on the creation of the MRDP, see S/2016/1032, paras 136-142).

Hans Nemandji told the Panel that he was involved in the coordination of anti-balaka field operations against the UPC and the transport of weapons from the Chadian border to the area of operations in the Ouaka Prefecture.

Sources: Meeting with Koméya and Nemandji, Bangui, 25 January 2017. Meeting with Koméya, Bambari, 11 April 2017. Meeting with Nemandji, Bangui, 20 May and 16 June 2017. Confidential report, 8 November 2016. Confidential report, 17 January 2017.

Annex 6.3: Seizures of 6,000 rounds of hunting ammunition manufactured in Pointe Noire, Republic of Congo, and coming from Zongo (DRC) in Port Beach, Bangui, on 9 May 2017.

Photograph obtained by the Panel from CAR customs, Bangui, on 14 June 2017.



Documents obtained by the Panel from CAR customs, Bangui, on 14 June 2017

FICHE DE SAISIE MARQUANTE

à compléter par les agents ou les agents experts de la Direction Générale des Douanes et des Impôts Indirects

PAYS : REPUBLIQUE CENTRAFRICAINE
ADMINISTRATION : DOUANES (CIBS)
UNITE / SERVICE : Dir. Régionale Douanes (Général)

NATURE DE LA SAISIE

Importation : Importation frauduleuse des produits agricoles
Date et lieu de saisie : Sur le fleuve Ouaka le 22 Avril 2017 à 14h00
Motif / Opération / Service de destination : Contrebande / Cts dissimulés dans la sève
Importation de destination / Origine : Indicateur et les agents de la douane

INFORMATION SUR L'IMPORTATEUR DETENTEUR OU L'INTRACTEUR

NOM / Prénoms : KANOUA PRINCE **Qualité (fonc) :** Elu Membre
Age (en Age) : 25 ans 24 ans **Sexe (en Age) :** 25 ans 24 ans
Profession : Contrôleur et inspecteur **Poste / Fonction :** Contrôleur et inspecteur

INFORMATION SUR LA MARCHANDISE

Type / Nature de la marchandise : Navigation de charbon
Quantité (unité) : 25 cts cartons 20 boîtes de 25 cts de cartons / litres
Poids (kg) : 25 kg
Origine : Republique du Congo (Brazzaville)
Provenance (ville) : Republique démocratique du Congo (Kinshasa)
Destination (ville) : Republique centrafricaine (CAR) Bangui
Valeur : 25 kg **Poids (en kg) : en pièce jointe**

MOYENS DE TRANSPORT

Moyen de transport : Balaison / Bateau
Remarque / Observation (comment) :
Marque / Marque :

AUTRES INFORMATIONS

Importation clandestine en dehors des heures fixes
effectuée dans la nuit avec la complicité des policiers
et les douaniers sans autorisation d'importation

Remarque : Cette fiche peut être remplie par des agents de tout grade et tout service



Rapport C2constitut21

Le Haut Roi d'Inde nous a écrit
à 20h45 saisi d'un colis contenant 250 de
cartouches de chasse (25gcs/kg) en provenance de
la République démocratique du Congo (Kinshasa)
informé par un indicateur, insère l'archivage de
documents comme officier de permanence, 15 minutes
nous sommes arrivés sur le lieu. Aidé par les
deux éléments de la force navale, aussitôt nous
avons informé le DGAS en entrant sur les faits.

Automatiquement le Directeur Général de l'Enseignement a réagi en demandant au DERN et de nous apporter l'appui avec les moyens logistiques.

Au total à 2115 la possession du colis est revenue sur le lieu de son forfait et nous l'avons intercepté de ramener les autres colis chose faite. Nous l'avons accompagné à son domicile du PK 10 avenue de l'interprétation et nous avons retrouvé les 23 autres colis que nous ramènerons à la base. tous ces déplacements, nous étions accompagnés du Sœur / on MASSIN-BOSSINCANT Sylviane.

Toutes les opérations sont terminées
à 22^h 05


- Ci-joint l'autorisation de circulation remis le 10.05.17

LA BOUTEILLE DE LA BOUTEILLE

Annex 6.4: Hunting ammunition produced by Manufacture de cartouches Congolais (MACC) in Pointe Noire, Republic of the Congo, and sold on markets in Bangassou, Béma, Yakoma and Bambari

During its missions in Kaga-Bandoro, Bambari and Bria, the Panel again observed the open selling of boxes of hunting ammunition manufactured in Pointe Noire, ROC, demonstrating that the ammunition-trafficking, already mentioned in the Panel's 2015 and 2016 reports, is ongoing.


Photographs taken by the Panel in Kaga Bandoro on 13 April 2017.



For earlier reports on the availability of hunting ammunition produced by MACC, see the Panel's 2015 report (S/2015/936, par. 214) and its 2016 report (S/2016/1032, par. 146 and Annex 4.10).

Annex 6.5: Seizures in Bangassou of MACC hunting ammunition, artisanal weapons and machetes.

Photographs taken by the Panel in Bangassou on 11 June 2017.



Several armed anti-balaka fighters were arrested by MINUSCA in Bangassou and transferred to national authorities in Bangui.

On 14 June 2017, the Panel interviewed an anti-balaka fighter detained by MINUSCA in Bangassou. He was captured while carrying an artisanal rifle, a knife and two rounds of hunting ammunition.

Photographs obtained by the Panel from MINUSCA on 13 June 2017.



Annex 6.6: Pictures of the gold mining site "Wily", Koro Mpoko, CAR.

- 1) Pictures obtained by the Panel from a confidential source on 8 June 2017.



- 2) Screenshots from the videoclip of the song "Gbaguéné" by the music band Emmaüs. The videoclip was recorded on the mining site "Wily".



Armed individuals present on the site.



Guy Gbaguéné with cash bills.



Annex 7.2: Military uniforms featuring the name of Colonel Libeba Baongoli, alias Freddy.

Photograph obtained by the Panel from confidential source on 27 June 2017.



Annex 7.3: Translated transcription of text messages from French to English

Text messages shown to the Panel on 14 June 2017, Bangui.

Deployment of armed forces:


85 in Mboma with 12 deaths;
65 in Greanda with 5 deaths;
55 in Satéma;
60 in Béma with 8 deaths;
75 in Mobaye with 7 deaths;
25 in Kongbo with 3 deaths;
408 in Bambari with 38 killed after confrontations.
A subtotal of 773 fighters, 73 killed, 17 deserted.
Total: 683 fighters

Weapons capacity of deployed armed forces:

4 weapons caliber 12.7
4 mortar bombs
1 weapon caliber 14.5
2 kassanova
8 CZ AK Pang
10 RPG7
12 DKM
15 RPK
191 AK47
60 R4FAMAS
10 M16
10 G3
20 MASS36
A subtotal of 347 weapons; 57 lost during confrontations.
Total: 290 weapons

Annex 8.1: Photos of the attacks against peacekeepers in Yogofongo, Mbomou prefecture, 8 May 2017.



Annex 8.2: Cases of rape reported, January-June 2017.

Information based on Panel's database.

Annex 8.3: Excerpt from the "Ali Darassa" school report, 2016-2017.

5/ TGH (TRIANGLE GENERATION HUMANTAIRE) DU JEUDI 28 AVRIL 2016 A 9 H**25 MIN.**

-Vente et entretien tenu ensemble avec la coordination

-Remise des kits , tablettes -bancs 32.

En vue des hiérarchies

- ✓ Le Chef de mission de l'ONG triangle Génération humanitaire
- ✓ Le Chef de base Margo
- ✓ Le Chef de projet
- ✓ L'assistant du Chef de Projet
- ✓ Le Représentant de l'ACE : l'inspecteur Fondamental1 Chef de Circonscription Scolaire et le Chef Secteur Scolaire Charge de Remcourse Humaine
- ✓ Le maire de la ville de Nibou
- ✓ Les membres de l'association des parents d'élèves.
- ✓ La Coordination Régionale des Organisations pour le Développement.
- ✓ Le groupement de la jeunesse
- ✓ Islamique : membre du comité

6/ MINUSCA (MISSION MULTIMENTIONNELLE INTEGRE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LA STABILISATION EN CENTRAFRIQUE) EN DEBUT ET EN FIN D'ANNEE

Mardi 18 mai 2016 . Décharge des programmes, la mise en place du bureau la construction du bâtiment de l'école.

Appuis financiers et matériels. les travaux ensemble avec les jeunes chrétiens et musulmans de Berton dans le cadre de la cohésion social et de la paix.

7/ UNICEF (ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ENFANCE) EN COMMUNION, EN PARTENARIAT AVEC L'ACE (INSPECTION ACADEMIQUE DU CENTRE-EST).

Remise des kits (soutiens scolaires) sac à dos, ardoises, cahiers, B-; (bleu-rouge), gomme, crayons, sacheis, compas aux élèves de tous les niveaux du fondamental1. (C-CMD)

8/ (SAVE THE CHILDREN (SCI)

Appuis financiers et matériels la matérielle en début d'année.

B.1.3) La journée du Vendredi 28 Octobre 2016

Visite et Remise des Kits, fournitures scolaires confondus par l'ONG, UNICEF (Organisation des Nations Unies pour l'enfance) en commun, en partenariat avec OCHA.

- Les ont effectué cette visite sur un programme d'appui humanitaire à l'école communautaire de la paix et les annexes : **Abdoulaye Sara**. École maternelle site élevage et école privée **Franco Arabe** du Mosquée centrale.
- A 11 heures, retour décharge des kits maternelsfondamentaux 1 et les Annexes. Les manuels et fournitures scolaires confondus.

B.1.4) La journée du Vendredi, 04 Novembre 2016

Remise des Kits scolaires l'ONG, HCR

B.1.5) La journée du Jeudi 10 Novembre 2016

Visite effectuée par le Monsieur **YAKILO JOACHIM PEPIN** chef secteur scolaires de **Bambari** à des écoles privées. Cette visite a pour objectif récupérer les données statiques : Personnels enseignants et administratifs intégrés contractuels non intégrés/enseignants maîtres-parents : grades/sexes.

Feuille de naissance **N°** matricule fonction date de prise et prise de service, il a reçu des informations s'est imprégné beaucoup des situations.

B.1.6) Visite des parents d'élèves fréquemment exposés des situations des élèves irréguliers, les absences non justifier les suivies régulière de leur enfants du début d'année et fin trimestre.

La sensibilisation leurs ont été apportées le directeur et le coordinateur dans l'enceinte école.

Annex 8.4: Victims in Niem.

Photographs given to the Panel by a confidential source, 4 May 2017.



Annex 8.5: Destruction of villages on the axis of Bocaranga-Koui.

Photographs taken by the Panel on 18 May 2017.

Village of Yade.



Annex 8.6: Additional humanitarian information**Occupation of schools by armed groups.**


During its visit to Bocaranga, on 18 May 2017, the Panel observed a school occupied by anti-balaka elements preventing children from attending classes.

Photographs taken by the Panel on 18 May 2017.



Gulu Passa, anti-balaka leader in Bocaranga

CAR Refugees in different countries



As of May 2017 Source: UNHCR

IDPs



As of 31 May 2017, there were 503,600 IDP in CAR Source UNHCR